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1 
Chapter One 
 
General Introduction and Overview of the Study 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Corruption is among the world’s devastating social, economic and political problems. It is 
enormous to the extent that “not one single country, anywhere in the world, is corruption-
free”.1 Its effects on the quality of life of billions of people around the world are widely 
acknowledged. Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General, in his statement on the adoption 
of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), proclaimed that: 
Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies. It 
undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts 
markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows organised crime, terrorism and other threats 
to human security to flourish.2 
Corruption takes different forms depending on the time and the social, political and 
economic circumstances that create avenues for its occurrence. Consequently, scholars 
construe corruption from different viewpoints. On the one hand, post-colonialists and 
Marxists perceive corruption as a product of capitalist pursuit of profit and capital 
accumulation.3 On the other hand, liberal-rationalists and free-market economists define 
corruption by looking at its negative effects on development and economic sustainability.4 
The argument is that corruption discourages foreign investment and allows public officials 
to siphon off resources for their private advantage, thereby defeating the public good. 
Despite the definitional and ideological differences found in literature, there is an 
agreement that corruption is a bad thing and should be fought vigorously. 
Although corruption is a global phenomenon, its enormity varies from one state to 
another.5 Countries with low income rates, low literacy levels and poor government 
functioning are more prone to corruption.6 Political leaders, particularly in developing 
countries, are accused of enriching themselves through corruption and they use such 
                                                          
1 Transparency International (2015). 
2 Secretary General “Statement on the Adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption” (31 October 2003). 
3 Ninsin (2000) and De Maria (2008). 
4 Mauro (1995) and Kaufmann (1997). 
5 Parliamentary Centre (2000) 20. 
6 Warf (2016) 663. 
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corruptly acquired wealth to perpetuate their stay into power.7 There is a widespread belief 
that poverty in developing countries is a result of the exploitation of the people by their 
own leaders.8 Hoseah identifies corruption as “the single greatest challenge that erodes and 
defeats efforts made by many nations, especially in the developing world, towards 
sustainable development and towards the promotion and strengthening of democratic 
institutions and values”.9 
Recognising the harm caused by corruption to humankind, individual nations and the 
international community have devised various measures to prevent and combat the vice. 
Corruption, which was initially “a local, moral and importantly, non-economic category, is 
now increasingly constructed in global, economic and legal terms”.10 International and 
regional legal instruments have been adopted, including the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
and the Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption. States have 
enacted laws and formulated policies aimed at eradicating the corruption malady. And civil 
society and non-governmental organisations have put a lot of effort into fighting this 
problem. However, corruption continues to escalate, especially in developing nations. 
Tanzania is a country where the rate of corruption is high. As various studies reveal, 
corruption has existed in the country in various forms and magnitude from the colonial era, 
throughout the post-independence state-controlled economy, up to current era of trade 
liberalisation and free-market economy.11 Initially after independence, corruption was seen 
as the product of the single party system.12 However, the problem has grown even more 
after the introduction of multi-party politics.13 As illustrated in Table 1 below, Tanzania’s 
corruption profile from 2000 to 2016, as published by Transparency International (TI) in its 
Corruption Perceptions Indices (CPIs), indicates no significant reduction of corruption. 
                                                          
7 Nyerere (2000) 82. 
8 Nyerere (2000) 82. 
9 Hoseah (2014) 384. 
10 Williams (1999) 503-505. 
11 Mashamba (2004) 14. 
12 Kasella-Bantu (1978) 25-26. 
13 Babeiya (2011) 91. 
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Table 1: Tanzania’s score and ranking in TI’s CPI from 2000 to 2016 
Year Score Rank 
2016 32/100 116/176 
2015 30/100 117/168 
2014 31/100 119/175 
2013 33/100 111/177 
2012 35/100 102/176 
2011 3.0/10 100/183 
2010 2.7/10 116/178 
2009 2.6/10 126/180 
2008 3.0/10 102/180 
2007 3.2/10 94/180 
2006 2.9/10 93/163 
2005 2.9/10 88/156 
2004 2.8/10 90/146 
2003 2.5/10 92/133 
2002 2.7/10 71/102 
2001 2.2/10 82/91 
2000 2.5/10 76/90 
Source: Transparency International, CPIs 2000-2016 
The country has witnessed a series of graft scandals over the past ten years including, in 
particular, the Richmond scandal in 2008 that involved the then Prime Minister, Edward 
Lowasa. Corruption persists despite the fact that, since its independence in 1961, Tanzania 
has adopted various statutes, regulations and policies aimed at preventing and combating it. 
Politically, all the five regimes that have led the country since independence have 
declared a commitment to fight corruption in all sectors.14 However, reports indicate that 
the effectiveness and impact of anti-corruption measures adopted differ from one regime to 
another. The first government regime generally is perceived to have been committed 
                                                          
14 Afro-Barometer & REPOA (2006) 1. 
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4 
sincerely to fighting corruption.15 This is not the case, however, with the second, third and 
fourth regimes, which are perceived not to have been zealous enough in fighting 
corruption.16 The fifth regime has been in office for one-and-a-half years now and has 
demonstrated a practical commitment to fighting corruption, with the President himself 
leading the campaign. The current President’s stance against corruption has prompted 
media houses to associate his government with the first post-independence government, 
during which President Julius Nyerere himself was on the anti-corruption frontline.17 
This leadership trend creates a paradox in the country’s anti-corruption system. 
Combating corruption appears to be based upon the will of individual leaders (especially 
Presidents) to do so. Despite having anti-corruption laws in force, Tanzania has been unable 
to establish a legal and institutional framework in terms of which state agencies and 
personnel are bound to fight corruption, regardless of who is heading the government. It is 
against this backdrop that this research seeks to explore avenues that may be adopted to 
create a sustainable anti-corruption regime in the country. 
1.2 Problem Statement  
While Tanzania has taken a variety of measures to legislate against corruption and put anti-
corruption policies in place, the rate of corruption in the country continues to escalate. The 
current anti-corruption regime provides no predictability, since enforcement of laws and 
policies depends on who is heading the government. When the head of the government is 
particularly weak on corruption, the problem escalates. Dependence upon the commitment 
of the leader of government to fight corruption renders legislation and policies futile, and 
the evils of corruption continue to undermine the nation, contrary to Tanzania’s vision and 
the African Union’s vision of creating a corruption-free society by 2025 and 2063 
respectively. 
                                                          
15 Msekwa (2012) 124-136. 
16 The Warioba Report (1996) indicates massive corruption in the public sector during the second 
government regime; the Law Reform Commission of Tanzania (LRCT) “Report on the Review of 
Legislation Relating to Corruption” (2004) indicates that corruption was still a serious problem in the 
country during the third government regime; and the country ranked 117th out of 168 countries in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, the year in which the fourth 
government regime completed its tenure. 
17 Lubasi (28 June 2016). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
  
 
 
 
5 
1.3 Background to the Problem  
Understanding Tanzania’s corruption and anti-corruption trends requires a survey of the 
country’s political and economic history. The fight against corruption in Tanzania dates back 
to 1930, when the British colonial government amended the Penal Code “to make it a 
criminal offence to demand, solicit and give or receive bribes”.18 This provision was 
perceived later as inadequate in curbing the ever-increasing threat of corruption. Thus, in 
1958 the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance was enacted to replace the provisions of the 
Penal Code on corruption. The Ordinance covered a wide range of corruption offences 
including “receiving gifts and commissions, which [were] considered to be corrupt 
transactions with agent and public servant obtaining an advantage without consideration”.19 
As there were few public servants at that time, this law was adequate for curbing 
corruption.20  
At the same time, anti-corruption was one of items on the nationalist agenda in the 
struggle for independence. Addressing Parliament in May 1960, Julius Nyerere, who was 
then the government’s Chief Minister, identified corruption as an “enemy of the people” 
that should be dealt with “in the same way as treason”. He said: 
I think I would be less than honest if I said that all is well, because it is not. There is 
corruption ... I think corruption must be treated with ruthlessness because I believe myself 
corruption and bribery is a greater enemy to the welfare of a people in peacetime than in 
war. I believe myself corruption in a country should be treated in almost the same way as 
you treat treason.21 
After independence, Tanzania adopted a socialist mode of economic development. The aim 
was to build a country where “all able-bodied men and women work for the collectivity in 
order to earn a living and no one is allowed to rip the fruits of other people’s labour”.22 
Consequently, anti-corruption measures were needed in order to eliminate chances for 
exploitation of citizens by public servants. Thus, in 1963 Parliament enacted the Minimum 
Sentences Act23 which imposed, in addition to imprisonment, corporal punishment of 
twenty-four strokes for offenders found guilty of taking part in a corrupt transaction with an 
                                                          
18 LRCT (2004) 8. 
19 LRCT (2004) 8. 
20 Warioba Report (1996) 11. 
21 Nyerere (1967) 82. 
22 Ngombale-Mwiru (1973) 53. 
23 Act 29 of 1963. 
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agent or obtaining an advantage without consideration contrary to Sections 3 and 6 of the 
Prevention of Corruption Ordinance respectively.24 
Despite the commitment to building an independent and self-reliant state, the new 
post-independence government still relied on foreign aid to operate. The First Five Year 
Development Plan envisaged that over 70 percent of the development finance would come 
from foreign private and government sources.25 These aid grants were not realised as 
anticipated, and “since leaders and bureaucrats did not have their own sources from which 
to accumulate wealth, they started targeting public resources”.26 
Further, economic hardships in the socialist bloc from the late 1960s to 1980s led to 
“low and declining civil service wages, combined with excess demand for public services”.27 
Essential goods and foodstuffs were scarce in almost all villages in the country and even in 
some urban areas.28 As a result, most middle-and lower-level public servants resorted to 
corrupt practices in the course of delivering services to the people.29 Parastatal officials hid 
the goods they produced until they were offered an extra corruption price called bei ya 
kuruka.30 In response, the government, in the 1965 Interim Constitution,31 established the 
Permanent Commission of Enquiry (PCE), which functioned as an Ombud to “check on the 
abuse of power by government officials and its agencies”.32 However, the PCE had no 
powers to investigate the President or the Head of the Executive for Zanzibar. Section 67(4) 
of the Interim Constitution specifically provided that: 
This section applies to persons in the service of the United Republic, persons holding office in 
the Party, the members and persons in the service of a local government authority and the 
members and persons in the service of such Commissions, corporate bodies established by 
statute and public authorities or boards, as may be specified by Act of Parliament, but does 
not apply to the President or the head of the Executive for Zanzibar. 
                                                          
24 Part I of the Schedule to the Minimum Sentences Act, 1963. 
25 Mbilinyi et al (1974) 73. 
26 Njunwa (accessed 4 January 2017) 11. 
27 World Bank (1998) 3. 
28 Kasella-Bantu (1978) 26. 
29 LRCT (2004) 9. 
30 Kasella-Bantu (1978) 26. 
31 Section 67(3) of the Interim Constitution, 1965. 
32 Afro-Barometer & REPOA (2006) 2. 
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Within six months the PCE had received 666 cases, which indicated that there was massive 
abuse of power in the public service.33 However, the PCE was not an anti-corruption organ. 
It neither could arrest nor prosecute corruption offenders and its decisions were mere 
recommendations submitted to the President.34 Thus, its work was constrained seriously 
and unfruitful in curbing corruption. Until 1975, there was no special body assigned the role 
of fighting corruption. Enforcement of anti-corruption laws all long had been the 
responsibility of the police force. 
Regrettably, the economic policy characterised by nationalisation under the Arusha 
Declaration of 1967 and the creation of public corporations to provide services and goods to 
the people, escalated the problem of corruption in the early years after independence.35 
The government reacted by enacting the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) of 1971 which 
replaced the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance of 1958. POCA criminalised both active 
and passive bribery, introduced the offence of illicit enrichment and provided for a 
presumption of corruption in certain cases involving contracts with government 
authorities.36 
The new legislation made possible the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Squad in 
1975.37 Section 2A(3) of POCA, as amended by the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) 
Act,38 provided for three major functions of the Squad: firstly, to take all necessary 
measures to prevent corruption in the public, parastatal and private sectors; secondly, to 
investigate and, subject to the directions of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), to 
prosecute offences involving corruption; thirdly, to advise the government and the general 
community on ways and means of preventing corruption. Many people were arrested, 
prosecuted and convicted as a result of the work done by the Anti-Corruption Squad.39 But 
the Squad was not an independent organ. It was established as a special department of the 
                                                          
33 Martin (1974) 201. 
34 Section 67(3) of the Interim Constitution, 1965. 
35 LRCT (2004) 9. 
36 Sections 3 & 9 of POCA. 
37 Established on 15 January 1975 via Government Notice No 17 of 1975. 
38 Act 2 of 1974. 
39 Warioba Report (1996) 24. 
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8 
police force. Further, the Squad had limited staff and resources. Thus, it relied heavily on 
the police force and the DPP for investigations and prosecutions.40 
In 1985, President Nyerere, who had led the country for twenty-five years, voluntarily 
stepped down from the presidency and Ali Hassan Mwinyi was elected head of the second 
post-independence regime. A few years later, economic crises in the socialist bloc forced 
Tanzania to abandon its socialist policies and adopt the structural adjustment programme 
advocated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in an effort to 
rescue its economy. A free-market economy, multi-party democracy, trade liberalisation 
and privatisation were introduced as part of the structural adjustment programme. The 
theory behind this programme argued that reducing state control over the economy would 
decrease the opportunities for corruption and influence proper administrative allocation of 
resources.41 
On the one hand, this initiative closed the doors upon the corrupt practices that were 
associated with the economic crisis of the 1980s. On the other hand, it opened avenues for 
grand corruption which was facilitated by the close relationship between government 
leaders and businessmen.42 
As the state of corruption worsened, the government made two legislative efforts to 
curb it. Firstly, POCA was amended in 1990 to transform the Anti-Corruption Squad into the 
Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB). However, as the name suggests, this organ was 
concerned primarily with preventing corruption. The PCB had a number of shortcomings, 
one of which was the lack of a “legal mandate or opportunity to follow up and/or prosecute 
corruption related to fraud”.43 Secondly, in 1995, the Tanzanian Parliament enacted the 
Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act,44 which established the Ethics Secretariat with a 
mandate to promote and monitor the conduct of public leaders, receive declarations of 
assets and investigate complaints about unethical behaviour on the part of public leaders. 
Despite these efforts, corruption continued to mushroom in public institutions. 
                                                          
40 Shaidi (1975) 112. 
41 Heilman & Ndumbaro (2002) 5. 
42 LRCT (2004) 11. 
43 PCCB (accessed 9 September 2016). 
44 Act 13 of 1995. 
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The year 1995 was also an election year and the country witnessed its first multi-party 
election since independence. Benjamin Mkapa, who campaigned on a “clean government” 
platform, was elected as Tanzania’s third post-independence President. In an interview after 
being elected, President Mkapa expressed his concern about corruption and his readiness to 
fight the problem. He said: “We must begin cultivating the confidence of the people that we 
mean business in fighting corruption.”45 
Within a year, he had appointed a Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Corruption, 
under the Chairmanship of Justice Joseph S Warioba (retired), known as the Warioba 
Commission, to assess the state of corruption in the country. The Report of the Commission 
(the Warioba Report) was published in 1996 and revealed massive corruption within the 
public sector.46 The Report established that “earlier strategies for combating corruption 
were not successful because efforts were being directed at dealing with corruption incidents 
and not in addressing the major causes giving rise to the problem”.47 
Building on the findings and recommendations of the Warioba Commission, the 
government, in the late 1990s, issued the National Framework on Good Governance, a 
document that “emphasised a government system that was transparent, responsive and 
accountable, managed by officials who are accountable, efficient, ethical and 
professional”.48 Thereafter, a National Anti-Corruption Strategy was prepared to guide all 
government organs in combating corruption. Government ministries, departments, 
institutions and local authorities were required to prepare their own Anti-Corruption Action 
Plans.49 These Action Plans were incorporated subsequently into the National Anti-
Corruption Strategy, to form the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan 
(NACSAP), published in November 1999. 
In 2001, Parliament passed the Public Procurement Act50 which, among others, 
prohibited corruption and fraudulent practices in public procurement. Section 60(2) 
required a procuring entity or an approving authority to reject a proposal for award of a 
contract or declare such person or firm ineligible to be awarded a public contract for ten 
                                                          
45 Mkapa (1995) 7. 
46 Warioba Report (1996). 
47 LRCT (2004) 13. 
48 Afro-Barometer & REPOA (2006) 2. 
49 Afro-Barometer & REPOA (2006) 2. 
50 Act 3 of 2001. 
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years if it was satisfied that any person or firm, to which it was proposed that a tender be 
awarded, had engaged in corrupt or fraudulent practices in competing for the contract in 
question. 
These measures taken by the Mkapa government suggest that corruption was being 
fought in all state entities. However, statistics tell a different story. As Table 1 above 
indicates, five years after the formulation of NACSAP, Tanzania continued to score below 3 
out of 10 in the CPI. A number of grand corruption scandals featured in the Mkapa 
government, including the civil aviation radar purchase deal in 1999. The deal involved the 
purchase of a civil aviation radar system from British Aerospace Engineering (BAE).51 Later 
investigations by the British Serious Fraud Office revealed that the deal was significantly 
corrupt and BAE subsequently was ordered to pay £30 million in fines.52 Generally, no 
significant anti-corruption results were attained by 2005, when the Mkapa government 
completed its term. 
The fourth post-independence government, too, began with a promise to fight 
corruption at all levels. President Kikwete, during the inauguration of the first Parliament of 
his term, declared that: 
Serikali ya awamu ya nne ... itaendeleza mapambano dhidi ya rushwa bila woga wala 
kuoneana muhali. (The fourth regime ... will continue to fight corruption without fear or 
favour).53 
It is to be noted here that Tanzania had ratified the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC) on 25 May 2005. One of UNCAC’s purposes is “to promote co-operation 
to prevent and combat transnational organised crime more effectively”.54 Tanzania, in its 
efforts to implement this purpose of UNCAC and to fulfil its obligations under other 
international instruments, enacted the Anti-Money Laundering Act in 2006.55 Section 3 of 
the Anti-Money Laundering Act incorporated “corrupt practices” as predicate offences for 
                                                          
51 Gray (2015) 388. 
52 Gray (2015) 388. 
53 Speech of President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete to the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania in 
Dodoma on 30 December 2005. Translation by author. 
54 Article 1 of UNCAC. 
55 Act 12 of 2006. The Act was amended in 2012 by the Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act 1 of 
2012. 
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offences of money laundering.  Subsequently the government enacted the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupting Act (PCCA) in 2007.56 
The PCCA repealed POCA and subsequently the PCB was transformed into the 
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB).57 Further, the PCCA increased the 
number of corruption crimes from four under POCA to twenty-four. The new crimes cover 
active and passive bribery; corrupt transactions in contracts, procurement, auctions and 
employment; bribery of foreign public officials; unjust enrichment; embezzlement and 
misappropriation; trading in influence; diversion; sexual corruption; and other forms of 
liability including aiding, abetting and conspiracy. Unlike the PCB which had only preventive 
powers, the PCCB is mandated to take “necessary measures for the prevention and 
combating of corruption in the public, parastatal and private sectors”.58 
The PCCA was a substantial step in Tanzania’s undertaking to curb corruption in both 
the public and private sectors. However, just one year after the establishment of the PCCB, 
a grand corruption scandal around an energy deal was exposed, involving high profile public 
leaders, including the then Prime Minister, Edward Ngoyai Lowasa, who offered to resign.59 
The government subsequently was contaminated by other grand corruption scandals, 
notably the poaching scandal that implicated the Chinese presidential aircraft in carrying 
ivory from Tanzania during the Chinese President’s visit in 2014,60 and the Escrow scandal 
that implicated government ministers and high profile politicians in receiving money (as gifts 
or payments) that was smuggled corruptly from the Central Bank of Tanzania.61 
Despite tougher laws being enacted during the Kikwete presidency, corruption 
within the public sector, involving senior government officials in particular, remained 
rampant. Thus, it is not surprising that Tanzania ranked 119 out of 175 and 117 out of 168 
countries in Transparency International’s CPI for 2014 and 2015 respectively. 
                                                          
56 Act 11 of 2007. 
57 Section 5 of the PCCA. 
58 Section 7 of the PCCA. 
59 BBC (7 February 2008). The Prime Minister resigned on 7 February 2008. 
60 See Environmental Investigation Agency (2014). The report showed that “2.9 tonnes of ivory 
concealed with shells” were linked to Chinese operations in Dar es Salaam. The report also revealed 
that “sophisticated criminal networks comprising Tanzanian poachers and middlemen, corrupt 
officials and Chinese traders [were] generating tens of millions of dollars in profits a year, with the 
bulk of the revenue accrued by the Chinese traffickers”. 
61 See NAOT (2014). 
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Tanzania’s fifth post-independence government, led by Dr John Pombe Magufuli, 
was elected in October 2015 and sworn in on 5 November 2015. During his election 
campaign, Magufuli expressed deep concern over corruption and vowed to fight it 
fearlessly. He demonstrated his commitment just one day after being sworn in by issuing 
directives to cut unnecessary expenses and allowances, and by firing and suspending many 
government officials. Since then the President has established himself as a leader with a 
zero-tolerance approach to corruption. He has facilitated also the establishment of the 
Corruption and Economic Crimes Division of the High Court to ensure timely prosecution 
and disposal of corruption cases.62 According to Section 3(3)(a) and paragraph 21 of the First 
Schedule to the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act,63 as amended by the Written 
Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 3 of 2016, all corruption offences under the PCCA 
exceeding Tsh1 billion in value fall within the primary jurisdiction of the Corruption and 
Economic Crimes Division of the High Court. 
The various initiatives which have been taken by President Magufuli indicate that he 
is committed to fight corruption vigorously. It is too early, however, to say whether that 
commitment will last for the rest of his term or whether the trend seen in the terms of his 
predecessors will re-emerge. 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The general objective of this study is to explore legal and institutional avenues that may be 
adopted to create a sustainable and working anti-corruption regime in Tanzania. Specifically, 
the study intends to: 
 assess anti-corruption legislative enforcement trends in Tanzania; 
 analyse anti-corruption policies and programmes adopted by different Tanzanian 
governments since independence and how they inform future regimes; and 
 examine the current government’s legal and institutional anti-corruption regime 
with a view to determining its effectiveness in curbing corruption. 
                                                          
62 The Division is established under the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act (Cap 200) through 
the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 3 of 2016. The Act came into force on 7 July 2016. 
63 Cap 200 RE 2002. 
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1.5 Significance of the Study 
Corruption has continued to affect social, political and economic conditions in Tanzania 
despite a series of anti-corruption legislative and policy measures being adopted by 
governments since the country’s independence in 1961. Tanzania’s Vision 2025 envisages a 
country free of corruption.64 However, anti-corruption regimes adopted since independence 
fail to provide significant indicators towards the realisation of this vision. In order to achieve 
Vision 2025, a different anti-corruption regime needs be elaborated. It is the legal and 
institutional structure of that different regime which this study intends to explore. 
1.6 Research Questions 
This research is governed by the following questions. They have been formulated with a 
view to finding a solution to the identified problem: 
1. What factors have favoured or impeded post-independence anti-corruption regimes 
in Tanzania? 
2. What are the deficiencies of the current legal and institutional regime in fighting 
corruption in Tanzania? 
3. What reforms are needed in order to create a sustainable anti-corruption regime for 
Tanzania? 
1.7 Scope of the Study 
This study is limited to Tanzania Mainland. Zanzibar has a different legal and institutional 
anti-corruption framework which is not covered in this study, except by reference. The 
study draws examples and lessons from other jurisdictions which recently have been 
acknowledged for good performance in anti-corruption. These are Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Botswana. However, this is not a comparative study proper. 
1.8 Research Methodology 
This research is a qualitative desktop study. Data was collected through primary and 
secondary sources, with the aim of analysing the research problem and formulating answers 
to the research questions. 
                                                          
64 Tanzania Development Vision 2025. 
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1.9 Chapter Outlines 
The study consists of four more chapters which are described below. 
Chapter Two: International Anti-Corruption Framework 
This chapter provides an analysis of international measures taken to combat corruption. 
Specifically, the chapter considers three instruments to which Tanzania is a State Party, 
namely, UNCAC, the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, and the SADC 
Protocol against Corruption. 
Chapter Three: Post-Independence Anti-Corruption Trends 
This chapter goes to the root of the research questions and research objectives. It reviews 
systematically the anti-corruption enforcement trends since independence, with a view to 
assessing their effectiveness and how they inform future trends. 
Chapter Four: Recalibrating Aspects of the Tanzanian Anti-Corruption Regime 
In this chapter, the findings of Chapter Three are used to develop a new approach to 
fighting corruption in Tanzania. Experience and inferences are drawn from Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Botswana, and harmonised with local circumstances to identify the elements of a 
sustainable and practicable Tanzanian anti-corruption regime. 
Chapter Five: General Conclusion 
This chapter expounds in summary the findings and recommendations emerging from the 
research. 
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Chapter Two 
 
International Anti-Corruption Framework 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
For the past two decades, corruption has been a critical subject in the international political 
arena. Since 1996, the international community has adopted more than 10 instruments 
aimed at combating corruption. This trend indicates the global agreement that combating 
corruption requires joint efforts and co-operation among states.1 Tanzania has joined these 
efforts by signing and ratifying three of these instruments. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the international framework against 
corruption. Focus is placed on prevention, criminalisation and law enforcement, as core 
elements of any sustainable anti-corruption regime. Such a regime requires an effective 
prevention strategy that is capable of reducing corruption opportunities in government 
departments, public institutions and the private sector. Comprehensive criminalisation is 
central to the legal fight against corruption and is a key to such anti-corruption activities as 
international co-operation and asset recovery. Further, efficient law enforcement is needed 
in “order to demonstrate to the public the government’s determination to eradicate 
corruption, as well as to demonstrate the strengths of the anti-corruption organs”.2 Without 
proper law enforcement, the public will be hesitant to report corruption, legislation will 
become debilitated and corruption will escalate. 
This chapter analyses the obligations and responsibilities that sovereign nations have 
under international law with the respect to anti-corruption. Such analysis is relevant for the 
assessment of Tanzania’s anti-corruption regime. The chapter will consider the three 
instruments to which Tanzania is a state party, namely, the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption,3 the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption,4 and the Southern African Development Community Protocol against 
Corruption.5 The intention is to examine the prevention, criminalisation and law 
                                                          
1 Carr (2007) 246. 
2 Man-wai (2006) 198. 
3 Ratified by Tanzania on 25 May 2005. 
4 Ratified by Tanzania on 22 February 2005. 
5 Ratified by Tanzania on 20 August 2003. 
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enforcement provisions contained in these instruments, as a lens through which Tanzania’s 
anti-corruption regime may be analysed and evaluated. Additionally, the role played by 
international financial institutions – the World Bank and the IMF – in fighting corruption is 
considered, given that a number of developing countries, including Tanzania are 
implementing anti-corruption programmes based on the conditionality imposed by the 
World Bank and the IMF. 
2.2 United Nations Convention against Corruption 
UNCAC is regarded as the most comprehensive and far-reaching international instrument in 
the fight against corruption.6 Currently with 140 signatories and 181 States Parties,7 UNCAC 
is said to be a real global response to the global challenge of corruption.8 UNCAC provides a 
forum where sovereign nations may put together efforts “to prevent and combat corruption 
more efficiently and effectively”.9 However, the linguistic style of the Convention indicates 
significant difficulty in formulating provisions of general application across states. Both 
mandatory and hortatory styles are used in the Convention. Hortatory provisions create the 
risk of enforcement disparity among states. Also, UNCAC features reservations in favour of 
domestic law in many of its provisions. Despite these challenges, UNCAC remains a 
significant achievement in international anti-corruption efforts. 
Substantively, UNCAC focuses on prevention and criminalisation of corruption, the 
establishment of law enforcement systems, the promotion and facilitation of international 
co-operation and technical assistance, and asset recovery. The Convention is designed to 
prevent and combat corruption in both the public and private sectors at both national and 
transnational levels. It also deals with corruption from both the supply and demand sides. 
Interestingly, UNCAC does not allow corrupt people to benefit from their crimes and 
promotes both domestic and international systems of asset recovery. 
2.2.1 Prevention of Corruption 
UNCAC devotes an entire chapter to the prevention of corruption. This indicates agreement 
amongst States Parties that prevention is a key to eradicating corruption. Prevention is very 
                                                          
6 Babu (2006) 1. 
7 Signature and Ratification Status as of 12 December 2016. 
8 Hechler (2010) 1. 
9 See Article 1 of UNCAC. 
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important because it seeks to fight corruption before the commission or execution of the 
offence.10 Hence, Article 5 of UNCAC provides that States Parties need to develop and 
implement policies and practices aimed at combating corruption. These policies and 
practices are to be implemented in both the public and private sectors. 
Prevention Agencies 
For purposes of implementing prevention policies and practices, UNCAC requires States 
Parties to establish a preventive anti-corruption body or such bodies.11 Said body or bodies 
are mandated to oversee and co-ordinate the implementation of corruption prevention 
policies, as well as increasing and disseminating knowledge about preventing corruption.12 
The body or bodies need to be properly resourced with well trained staff and afforded the 
independence as necessary to carry out their functions effectively.13 
Considering the range of functions allocated to these preventive agencies, a debate 
has risen among scholars as to whether a single body will suffice. For example, while 
Hussmann et al argue that a single public institution cannot implement anti-corruption 
policies effectively,14 South Africa’s Corruption Watch believes that effective anti-corruption 
lies not in having multiple institutions but in having “serious political commitment” backing 
up the agency.15 Whatever the prevention institutional structure employed – whether a 
single body or different bodies – the spirit of Article 6 of UNCAC is to see that corruption 
prevention practices and policies work. 
Public Sector Prevention 
UNCAC provides a wide range of policies intended to prevent corruption in the public 
sector. Essentially, the Convention seeks to create transparency, probity and accountability 
in the conduct of public affairs. As one preventive measure, UNCAC requires States Parties 
to adopt and implement systems of public service based on recruitment, retention and 
promotion criteria which are objective and transparent and which are accompanied by 
                                                          
10 Doig (2012) 3. 
11 Article 6 of UNCAC. 
12 Article 6(1)(a) & (b) of UNCAC. 
13 Article 6(3) of UNCAC. 
14 Hussmann et al (2009) 15. 
15 Corruption Watch (2013). 
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payment of adequate and equitable remuneration.16 In order to promote honesty, integrity, 
transparency and accountability in the public sector, States Parties are obligated to apply 
codes of conduct for public officials.17 
Public sector prevention measures also call upon States Parties to promote 
transparent systems of public procurement and management of public funds, together with 
enhancing transparency in public administration generally.18 Interestingly, UNCAC notes the 
significance of the Judiciary in the fight against corruption and calls upon States Parties to 
“take measures to strengthen integrity and prevent opportunities for corruption among 
members of the judiciary”.19 This is an important provision because a corrupt Judiciary 
undermines people’s confidence in governance by allowing corruption to accelerate across 
the public sector, thereby creating the perception that corruption is acceptable.20 
Private Sector Prevention 
Article 12 of UNCAC appears to be the result of an appreciation of the role played by the 
private sector as the “supply side” of corruption.21 UNCAC requires States Parties to take 
measures to prevent corruption involving the private sector. In so doing, States Parties have 
to promote co-operation between the private sector and law enforcement agencies; set 
codes of conduct and prevent conflicts of interests; prevent misuse of regulatory 
procedures such as subsidies and licences; and establish accounting and auditing controls. 
UNCAC also places an obligation on States Parties to “disallow the tax deductibility of 
expenses that constitute bribes”.22 
Participatory Prevention 
UNCAC recognises the role and necessity of involving the public in preventing corruption. It 
is believed that those who have been (or are likely to be) affected, directly or indirectly, by 
corruption must be involved actively in the process of addressing and preventing it.23 Thus, 
Article 13 of UNCAC calls upon States Parties to involve individuals, civil society, non-
                                                          
16 Article 7 of UNCAC. 
17 Article 8 of UNCAC. 
18 Articles 9 & 10 of UNCAC. 
19 Article 11 of UNCAC. 
20 Transparency International (2007) xxi. 
21 Low (2006) 6. 
22 Article 12(4) of UNCAC. 
23 UNODC (2009) 62. 
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governmental organisations and community based organisations in raising public awareness 
about corruption, participating in decision-making and reporting incidents of corruption. It 
also encompasses the provision of means through which citizens can access public 
information and through which they are able to express concerns and allegations without 
fear.24 
2.2.2 Criminalisation of Corruption and Law Enforcement 
Effective implementation of UNCAC depends upon the readiness of States Parties to 
translate its provisions into national law. In order to ensure that no corrupt act goes 
unpunished, UNCAC encompasses a wide array of conduct that constitutes corruption and 
which States Parties are called upon to criminalise in their domestic laws. There are eight 
core corruption crimes under UNCAC. These are supplemented by other forms of liability, 
including liability of legal persons, and participation, attempt and preparation for an offence 
established under the Convention. 
The Convention criminalises corruption in both the public and private sectors. 
However, it is important to note that the criminalisation part of the Convention has two 
categories of obligations. The first covers mandatory offences which States Parties must 
establish as crimes. The second covers non-mandatory offences which States Parties are 
called upon to consider establishing as crimes in their national laws. 
Mandatory Offences 
UNCAC contains five articles that establish mandatory corruption offences. The offences 
are: bribery of national public officials; active bribery of foreign public officials and officials 
of public international organisations; embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of 
property by a public official; laundering of proceeds of crime; and obstruction of justice.25 
According to the UNODC: 
The acts covered by these offences are instrumental to the commission of corrupt acts and 
the ability of offenders to protect themselves and their illicit gains from law enforcement 
authorities.26 
                                                          
24 UNODC (2009) 62. 
25 Articles 15, 16(1), 17, 23 & 25 of UNCAC. 
26 UNODC (2006) 77. 
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Therefore, criminalising these offences is a basic part of the co-ordinated global effort 
against corruption.27 States Parties have an obligation to take legislative or other measures 
necessary to establish these acts as offences in their national laws. 
Non-Mandatory Offences 
There are a number of articles in UNCAC that establish non-mandatory offences. States 
Parties are required only to consider establishing such offences under their national laws. 
They include passive bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international 
organisations, trading in influence, abuse of functions, illicit enrichment, bribery in the 
private sector, embezzlement of property in the private sector, and concealment of 
proceeds of corruption.28 UNCAC sets minimum criminalisation standards and states are 
encouraged to go beyond these.29 UNCAC therefore contains quite a number of non-
mandatory offences so as “to cover as many types of misconduct as possible”.30 
Liability of Legal Persons 
Legal persons such as corporations, companies and charitable organisations may be held 
liable for their participation in corrupt practices that are criminalised under UNCAC.31 Such 
liability may be civil, criminal or administrative in nature.32 With globalisation and trade 
liberalisation, corporations have a wide range of activities and can operate in different 
countries under different structures. Corporate structures increasingly become complex to 
the extent that makes it hard sometimes to ascertain who is responsible for particular 
corporate actions or decisions.33 Further, individuals responsible might be residing outside 
the jurisdiction of the State Party in which the corrupt act was committed.34 Generally, 
there are various corporate escape routes that can shield individuals from liability. To 
overcome this hurdle, UNCAC imposes corporate liability as a complement to individual 
liability of natural persons. Accordingly, corporate liability has to operate “without prejudice 
                                                          
27 UNODC (2006) 77. 
28 Articles 16(2), 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 & 24 of UNCAC. 
29 UNODC (2006) 77. 
30 UNODC (2006) 99. 
31 Article 26(1) of UNCAC. 
32 Article 26(2) of UNCAC. See also UNODC (2006) para 180. 
33 UNODC (2006) para 315. 
34 UNODC (2006) para 315. 
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to the criminal liability of natural persons” who commit the offence.35 When legal persons 
are found liable for corruption, UNCAC requires States Parties to impose effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions – criminal or civil –against the offenders.36 
Supplementary Forms of Liability 
As noted earlier, UNCAC intended to “cover as many types of misconduct as possible”.37 In 
that connection, Article 27 criminalises participation, attempt and preparation for the 
commission of a corruption offence. States Parties have a hard obligation to criminalise 
‘participation’ but there is a soft obligation with respect to ‘attempt’ and ‘preparation’.38 
The provision on participation intends to cover various degrees, such as accomplices and 
assistants or instigators, but States Parties are not obligated to cover all such degrees in 
their domestic laws.39 
Law Enforcement 
Prevention and criminalisation of corruption cannot be successful without the presence of 
effective and efficient law enforcement mechanisms. Accordingly, UNCAC includes a wide 
range of measures, standards and mechanisms required for detecting, investigating, 
prosecuting and punishing corruption crimes. It also provides measures for reparations 
relating to the consequences of acts of corruption. Particularly, UNCAC contains rules 
governing evidentiary standards; prescription periods for instituting corruption proceedings; 
prosecution, adjudication and sanctions; freezing, seizure and confiscation of proceeds of 
corruption; and principles for the protection of witnesses, victims and whistleblowers.40 
Further, the Convention requires the existence of specialised anti-corruption agencies and 
measures for enhancing co-operation amongst law enforcement authorities, national 
authorities and the private sector (including offenders).41 Also, the Convention seeks to 
prevent bank secrecy laws from impeding investigations.42 Lastly, UNCAC calls upon States 
                                                          
35  Article 26(3) of UNCAC. 
36  Article 26(4) of UNCAC.  
37 UNODC (2006) 99. 
38 Article 27(1)-(3) of UNCAC. 
39 UNGA (2003) 6. 
40 Articles 28–33 of UNCAC. 
41 Articles 36–39 of UNCAC. 
42 Article 40 of UNCAC. 
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Parties to address the consequences of corruption by providing remedies for victims, 
including measures to ensure compensation for damages suffered.43 
2.3 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
The AU Convention is the first African agreement against corruption since the establishment 
of the African Union in July 2000.44 In addition to the indirect social, economic and political 
effects, corruption is estimated to cost the continent some US$148 billion annually.45 The 
AU Convention is concerned about these negative effects of corruption and sets out “to 
pursue, as a matter of priority, a common penal policy aimed at protecting the society 
against” this problem.46  
The AU Convention aims at achieving five objectives: first, to promote and 
strengthen the development of anti-corruption mechanisms in Africa; second, to promote, 
facilitate and regulate transnational anti-corruption co-operation in Africa; third, to co-
ordinate and harmonise anti-corruption policies and legislation among States Parties; 
fourth, to remove obstacles that hinder enjoyment of socio-economic, civil and political 
rights; and fifth, to establish mechanisms for fostering transparency and accountability in 
public affairs.47 
2.3.1 Criminalisation of Corruption 
The AU Convention defines corruption ostensively, listing the acts regarded to be corrupt.48 
Accordingly, Article 4 catalogues the acts of corruption which the Convention proscribes. 
They include the solicitation or acceptance of bribes by a public official or any other person; 
the offering or granting of bribes to a public official or any other person; the abuse of duty 
by a public official or any other person for the purpose of obtaining illicit benefits; the 
fraudulent diversion of state property or property belonging to state agencies; and active 
and passive bribery in the private sector.49 Further, the Convention applies to the offences 
                                                          
43 Articles 34 & 35 of UNCAC. 
44 Olaniyan (2004) 75. 
45 Olaniyan (2004) 75. 
46 Paras 6 & 9 of the Preamble to the AU Convention. 
47 Article 2(1)-(5) of the AU Convention. 
48 Article 1 of the AU Convention defines corruption to mean “acts and practices including related 
offences proscribed in this Convention”. 
49 Article 4(1)(a)-(e) of the AU Convention. 
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of influence peddling, illicit enrichment and concealment of proceeds of corruption.50 In 
addition, it criminalises participation, collaboration and conspiracy in the commission or 
attempted commission of proscribed acts of corruption.51 
2.3.2 Law enforcement 
States Parties are required to undertake legislative or other measures to ensure that the 
objectives of the Convention are met. They should establish as offences in their domestic 
jurisdictions the acts listed in Article 4(1) of the Convention.52 They have to strengthen 
national control measures to ensure that foreign companies operate subject to national 
legislation.53 Further, States Parties have to ensure the existence of national anti-corruption 
bodies, and they have to strengthen accounting procedures in the public sector.54 However, 
the accounting provision has been criticised for not setting the same accounting standards 
for the private sector.55 Schroth notes that leaving the private sector out of the accounting 
requirements is a serious flaw in the fight against bribery by corporations.56 
The AU Convention also requires States Parties to take measures for the protection 
of whistleblowers. The significance of whistleblowers in the exposure and prosecution of 
corruption offences is recognised widely.57 The AU Convention acknowledges the role of 
whistleblowers in Article 5(5)-(6). However, Article 5(7) creates an obligation that might 
defeat the essence of whistleblowing. It requires States Parties to punish persons “who 
make false and malicious reports against innocent persons”.58 As Schroth puts it: 
the threat of such punishment is an effective deterrent to honest whistleblowers who 
expose the guilty, because even truthful assertions may be very difficult to prove, 
particularly if the opposition in court has the extensive resources of the state or a large 
corporation.59 
                                                          
50 Article 4(1)(f)-(h) of the AU Convention. 
51 Article 4(1)(i) of the AU Convention. 
52 Article 5(1) of the AU Convention. 
53 Article 5(2) of the AU Convention. 
54 Article 5(3)-(4) of the AU Convention. 
55 Schroth (2005) 29. 
56 Schroth (2005) 29. 
57 See Harutyunyan & Schultz (2015) and Smith (2010). 
58 Article 5(7) of the AU Convention. 
59 Schroth (2005) 34. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
  
 
 
 
24 
2.3.3 Preventive Measures 
Sadly, the AU Convention has little to say about the prevention of corruption. Article 5(8) 
provides that states should adopt anti-corruption education programmes as a means of 
preventing corruption. In addition, Article 10(2) calls for transparency in the funding of 
political parties. With regard to the private sector, Article 11 calls upon states to establish 
mechanisms for enhancing private sector participation in fighting “unfair competition” and 
to prevent companies from paying bribes when bidding for tenders. These preventive 
measures are manifestly inadequate. The lack of attention given to prevention is 
disappointing, especially since prevention features in the name of the Convention. 
2.4 Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption 
SADC member nations share a variety of attributes, including borders, culture and history. 
Importantly, they also have similar social, economic and political problems.60 Corruption is 
one such problem that is common across the SADC region. The CPI of Transparency 
International identifies the sub Saharan region, which includes the SADC countries, as one of 
the two regions where the level of corruption is perceived to be particularly high.61 The 
SADC Protocol explicitly takes cognisance of these facts and of the adverse effects that 
corruption has on the region, and undertakes to provide “a joint and concerted” regional 
effort in the fight against corruption.62 
2.4.1 Criminalisation of Corruption 
The SADC Protocol defines corruption to mean: 
any act referred to in Article 3 and includes bribery or any other behaviour in relation to 
persons entrusted with responsibilities in the public and private sectors which violates their 
duties as public officials, private employees, independent agents or other relationships of 
that kind and aimed at obtaining undue advantage of any kind for themselves or others.63 
Accordingly, Article 3 enumerates the acts which amount to corruption to include: the 
solicitation, acceptance, offering or granting of bribes by a public official in the performance 
of his public functions; the abuse of public duty for purposes of obtaining illicit benefits; the 
fraudulent diversion of public property by public officials; offering, accepting, solicitation or 
                                                          
60 Nsereko & Kebonang (2005) 85. 
61 Transparency International (2016). The sub-Saharan region scored 31 out of 100. The other region is 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia which scored 34 out of 100 in the 2016 CPI. 
62 Para 11 of the Preamble to the SADC Protocol. 
63 Article 1 of the SADC Protocol. 
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promising of bribes to or by persons working in the private sector; influence peddling; and 
concealment of proceeds of corruption.64 Further, the SADC Protocol criminalises 
participation, collaboration or conspiracy in the commission or attempted commission of 
any act of corruption.65 
2.4.2 Preventing Corruption 
The SADC Protocol affirms the need to eliminate corruption through preventive and 
deterrent measures.66 Article 4 lays down the preventive measures that have to be 
undertaken by States Parties. Firstly, they have to adopt and maintain standards of conduct 
for public officials.67 Such standards must require public officials not to obtain private gifts 
or other advantages while performing their official duties.68 Secondly, States Parties have to 
create transparent, equitable and efficient systems for the hiring and procurement of goods 
and services.69 This measure is particularly significant because sometimes individuals are 
required to provide material, financial or sexual inducements in order to be hired.70 Again, 
government procurement, especially in the construction industry, often has been vulnerable 
to corruption.71 
Thirdly, there need to be strong “revenue collection and control systems that deter 
corruption”.72 Fourthly, there ought to be mechanisms to protect corruption informers.73 
However, like the AU Convention, the SADC Protocol also calls upon States Parties to enact 
laws that would punish informers “who make false and malicious reports against innocent 
persons”.74 While the former is a necessary measure towards uncovering corruption, the 
latter can be a stumbling block that might defeat the purpose of having informers.75 
                                                          
64 Article 3(a)-(g) of the SADC Protocol. 
65 Article 3(h) of the SADC Protocol. 
66 Paragraph 9 of the Preamble to the SADC Protocol. 
67 Article 4(1)(a) of the SADC Protocol. 
68 Nsereko & Kebonang (2005) 92. 
69 Article 4(1)(b) of the SADC Protocol. 
70 Nsereko & Kebonang (2005) 93. 
71 OECD (2016) 7. 
72 Article 4(1)(c) of the SADC Protocol. 
73 Article 4(1)(e) of the SADC Protocol. 
74 Article 4(1)(f) of the SADC Protocol. 
75 See Schroth (2005) 34. 
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Fifthly, measures to deter bribery should be established.76 Deterrents may include 
setting and maintaining accounting requirements, effective enforcement of laws relating to 
the registration and operation of companies and other corporate bodies, and imposing 
sanctions on violators.77 Preventive measures include also public education and awareness, 
and the participation of society, the media and NGOs.78 
2.4.3 Law Enforcement 
States Parties have an obligation to adopt legislative or other measures necessary to 
criminalise acts stipulated as offences in the SADC Protocol.79 These measures need to be 
accompanied by the availability of institutions vested with powers to prevent, detect, 
punish and eradicate corruption.80 Anti-corruption institutions serve as notice to all 
individuals, officials and private agents that they are subject to detection, investigation and 
prosecution whenever they become involved in corrupt practices. According to Nsereko & 
Kebonang, efficacious anti-corruption institutions need to meet three criteria: 
First, they must be independent of the executive branch of government in the manner in 
which their leadership is appointed, in their day-to-day operations and in financial matters. 
Second, they must have the power to initiate investigations and if the evidence they find so 
warrants, to commence the prosecutions of the suspects. Third, they must enjoy the political 
support of the powers that be.81 
Effective and efficient law enforcement machinery is necessary to make anti-corruption 
conventions living instruments. Without enforcement, conventions remain paper tigers and 
corruption keeps spreading. 
2.5 Role of International Financial Institutions 
Before 1996, anti-corruption was never on the agenda of global financial institutions, 
particularly the World Bank and the IMF. These institutions were aware of the problem but 
nobody dared talk about it.82 James Wolfensohn, the President of the World Bank, broke the 
ice in 1996 when he called upon financial institutions to fight the “cancer of corruption”.83 
                                                          
76 Article 4(1)(h) of the SADC Protocol. 
77 Nsereko & Kebonang (2005) 106–111. 
78 Article 4(1)(i)-(j) of the SADC Protocol. 
79 Article 7(2) of the SADC Protocol. 
80 Article 4(1)(g) of the SADC Protocol. 
81 Nsereko & Kebonang (2005) 102. 
82 World Bank (2007) 38. 
83 World Bank (2007) 38. 
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The following year, 1997, the IMF and the World Bank both took to fighting corruption and 
enhancing good governance within their member nations. The role played by these 
institutions in monitoring the governance performance of countries, particularly anti-
corruption, is evident in their development projects and support programmes. 
2.5.1 International Monetary Fund 
Traditionally, the IMF focused “on encouraging countries to correct macroeconomic 
imbalances, reduce inflation, and undertake key trade, exchange, and other market reforms 
needed to improve efficiency and support sustained economic growth”.84 There was no 
direct involvement by the Fund in governance issues. Thus, corruption was outside the 
scope of its activities. However, for the past two decades the IMF’s concern with and action 
in governance has grown tremendously. In September 1996, the IMF’s Interim Committee 
noted that “promoting good governance in all its aspects, including ensuring the rule of law, 
improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption”, 
was an integral aspect in the framework of sustained economic growth.85 
In 1997 the IMF adopted guidelines on its role in governance issues. Through the 
guidelines, the IMF limits its involvement to “economic aspects of governance – including 
the avoidance of corrupt practices”.86 The Fund committed to focusing on two aspects: 
“improving the management of public resources through reforms covering public sector 
institutions”; and “supporting the development and maintenance of a transparent and 
stable economic and regulatory environment conducive to efficient private sector 
activities”.87 Based on this limitation, the IMF can involve itself in instances of corruption 
only if such instances have “significant macroeconomic implications”.88 
The IMF mode of involvement in governance issues comprises three aspects. The 
first is “support of policy reforms that remove opportunities for rent-seeking activities”.89 
This aspect includes: 
enhancing transparency in decision making and budgetary processes, reductions in tax 
exemptions and subsidies, improved accounting and control systems, improvements in 
                                                          
84 See IMF (1997) v. 
85 IMF (1997) v. 
86 IMF (1997) 3. 
87 IMF (1997) 3. 
88 IMF (1997) 5. 
89 IMF (1997) 6. 
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statistical dissemination practices, improvements in the composition of public expenditure, 
and accelerated civil service reform.
90 
To ensure that policy reforms are implemented, the IMF imposes “conditionality” on states 
that benefit from IMF resources, including loans and grants.91 Failure by the recipient state 
to meet the conditionality can result in suspension or delaying of financial assistance from 
the IMF.92 
Secondly, the IMF helps to “strengthen institutions and administration capacity” in 
member states.93 This role is undertaken by providing technical assistance to governments 
in areas where the IMF has expertise, such as “budget management and control, tax and 
customs administration, central bank laws and organisation, foreign exchange laws and 
regulations, and macroeconomic statistical systems and dissemination practices”.94 Thirdly, 
the IMF co-operates with other multilateral institutions and donors, particularly the World 
Bank, in addressing economic governance issues.95 
However, despite its efforts to promote good governance, the IMF does not put 
itself in the anti-corruption frontline but aims only to “strengthen the hands of those in the 
government seeking to improve governance”.96 The IMF believes that responsibility for anti-
corruption and governance rests primarily with the national authorities.97 Recently the IMF 
suspended its lending to Ukraine and Malawi due governance issues, including corruption.98 
2.5.2 World Bank 
Like the IMF, the World Bank also places on national governments the primary responsibility 
in governance issues.99 In September 1997, the World Bank launched its global anti-
corruption agenda, indicating its intended role in helping countries combat corruption.100 
Up to 2013, the Bank was reported to be spending US$10 million annually on investigating 
                                                          
90 IMF (1997) 7. 
91 See “IMF Conditionality” (accessed 27 October 2016). 
92 IMF (1997) 8. 
93 IMF (1997) 7. 
94 IMF (1997) 7. 
95 IMF (1997) 10. 
96 IMF (1997) 3. 
97 IMF (1997) 3. 
98 Ukraine was suspended in February 2016 while Malawi was suspended in November 2013. See IMF 
(2016) 16. 
99 See World Bank (2007) ii. 
100 See World Bank (1997). 
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corruption allegations, with an investigation department of over 50 staff, and had 
commenced around 600 anti-corruption and governance programmes in about 100 
countries.101 
The World Bank’s anti-corruption strategy encompasses three major aspects. Firstly, 
the Bank seeks to “prevent fraud and corruption within Bank-financed projects”.102 This role 
is particularly important in order to ensure that the Bank’s resources are used for the 
designated goals. It is important also for maintaining the Bank’s credibility as an institution 
with fiduciary obligations to its shareholders, partners and other stakeholders.103 Thus, the 
Bank provides guidelines and monitors procurements, loan disbursements, financial 
reporting, supervision and auditing procedures in all its financed projects.104 
Secondly, the Bank provides support to the efforts of individual countries to fight 
corruption.105 It acknowledges that anti-corruption cannot succeed simply by imposing 
external conditionality on countries.106 Therefore, the Bank sets itself to help countries that 
need its support to carry out their governance and anti-corruption programmes. It looks at 
the country’s development vision and challenges, and selects a support programme 
“tailored to the country’s needs”.107 The Bank’s support includes designing and 
implementing anti-corruption programmes, assisting in economic policy reform and 
institutional strengthening, and facilitating workshops related to governance.108 
Thirdly, the World Bank contributes to international anti-corruption efforts.109 It 
recognises that corruption is an international problem that needs international attention.110 
The Bank’s international anti-corruption role focuses on ensuring that “its member 
countries derive the greatest benefit from the synergy between its activities and those of 
other international actors”.111 In so doing, the Bank is committed to co-operating with other 
multilateral institutions, contributing to the work of international organisations such as the 
                                                          
101 Wanless (2013) 39. 
102 World Bank (1997) 3. 
103 World Bank (2007) 24. 
104 World Bank (1997) 29-33. 
105 World Bank (1997) 35. 
106 World Bank (1997) 5. 
107 World Bank (2007) 11. 
108 World Bank (1997) 39. 
109 World Bank (1997) 58. 
110 World Bank (1997) 58. 
111 World Bank (1997) 62. 
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OECD and the UN, and strengthening partnerships “with civil society, the media and the 
private sector”.112 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
Considered as a whole, the international anti-corruption framework encapsulates a general 
consensus that a multifaceted approach is necessary for fighting corruption. On the one 
hand, international political bodies, such as the UN and the AU, have undertaken to fight 
corruption through legislative means, calling upon states to adopt comprehensive legislative 
and enforcement measures to prevent and eradicate corruption. On the other hand, 
international financial institutions, particularly the IMF and the World Bank, have 
formulated policies and mechanisms as contributions to the international campaign against 
corruption. However, all these approaches depend on the readiness of individual 
governments to consider anti-corruption as their primary objective. Therefore, without 
effective commitment and action from sovereign governments to fight corruption, these 
international measures stand to be unproductive. 
Tanzania, being a signatory to the conventions discussed above and a member of the 
World Bank and the IMF, is bound by their provisions and policies. The country has a duty to 
take legislative and policy measures to ensure that it complies with its international 
obligations. The extent to which Tanzania complies with these obligations is the subject 
matter of the next chapter of this study. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Post-Independence Anti-Corruption Trends 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Since independence in 1961, Tanzania has adopted various economic and political policies 
that have affected the country’s corruption and anti-corruption trends. At independence, 
Tanzania retained the colonial capitalist economic system. This changed in 1967, when it 
adopted socialism as its model for economic development and political structure. However, 
the economic depression and fall of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe during the 1980s 
forced Tanzania to abandon socialism in favour of free-market and liberalisation policies. 
Politically, the country has moved from a multi-party system at the time of independence, 
to a single-party system in 1965 and back to a multi-party system in 1992. 
This chapter examines Tanzania’s anti-corruption trends across the five post-
independence government regimes. The chapter goes to the root of the research objectives 
by assessing post-independence anti-corruption legislative enforcement trends; by analysing 
anti-corruption policies and programmes adopted by the different Tanzanian governments 
since independence; and by examining the current government’s legal and institutional anti-
corruption regime with a view to determining its effectiveness in curbing corruption. 
Further, the chapter seeks to answer the first research question: what factors have favoured 
or impeded post-independence anti-corruption efforts in Tanzania? 
Corruption has been rampant in all the five post-independence government regimes. 
However, its extent differs from one government regime to another. And although the post-
independence government regimes have employed different approaches to fighting 
corruption, they have one common feature: all focus on criminalisation and give little 
attention to law enforcement and prevention. Consequently, many laws have been enacted 
to criminalise corruption in various sectors, but without the establishment of efficient 
enforcement systems. Further, institutions charged with corruption control have been 
constrained by many factors that weaken their capacity to fight the problem. 
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3.2 First Post-Independence Regime 
During the first few years after independence, corruption resulted from the desire among 
nationalist leaders to amass wealth and property. As the PCCB put it, “they wanted to step 
into the shoes of their former colonial masters and capitalists in every way”.1 However, the 
African bourgeoisie had neither capital nor its own sources of income from which it could 
accumulate wealth. Therefore, the only option was to target public resources.2 Eventually, 
elite classes started accumulating wealth at the expense of the rest of the population.3 
As corruption unfolded, the government under President Nyerere took legal and 
policy measures to fight it. The legal measures included the enactment of the Minimum 
Sentences Act 29 of 1963 by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) government. In 
addition to imprisonment, the Act imposed corporal punishment of twenty-four strokes for 
offenders found guilty of taking part in a corrupt transaction with an agent or obtaining an 
advantage without consideration contrary to Sections 3 and 6 of the Prevention of 
Corruption Ordinance.4 
Politicians were bound by the party’s rules and policies. One of the objectives of 
TANU was “to see that the Government eradicates all types of exploitation, intimidation, 
discrimination, bribery and corruption”.5 Further, the Constitution of TANU contained a 
member’s pledge to fight corruption. The pledge stated that: “Corruption perverts justice; I 
shall neither offer nor accept bribes”.6 Corruption was condemned by both the government 
and the Party. 
Further, in 1965 the government established the Permanent Commission of Enquiry 
(PCE), an organ empowered to “check on the abuse of power by government officials and 
agencies”.7 It had powers to enquire into the conduct of any Government or party official, 
except the President.8 Reports of the PCE were to be submitted to the President.9 
                                                          
1 PCCB (2015) 2. 
2 PCCB (2015) 2. 
3 Shivji (1973) 307. 
4 Part I of the Schedule to the Minimum Sentence Act, 1963. 
5 Article 2 of the Constitution of TANU. 
6 Article 5 of the Constitution of TANU. 
7 Afro-Barometer & REPOA (2006) 2. 
8 Section 67(4) of the Interim Constitution of Tanzania, 1965. 
9 Section 67(3) of the Interim Constitution of Tanzania, 1965.  
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The vision of TANU and President Nyerere was to build a classless socialist state. This 
was propounded clearly in the Constitution of TANU and later in the famous Arusha 
Declaration of 1967. Nyerere attacked as “anti-social” the capitalist nature of private 
accumulation of wealth.10 Adopting socialism had a dual impact. Firstly, all party and 
government leaders and civil servants were prohibited from associating with so-called 
capitalist practices, including holding shares or directorships in a company or any privately-
owned enterprise.11 Secondly, all major means of production, financial institutions, 
production industries, and the main import and export establishments were put under 
government control.12 TANU believed that “in order to ensure economic justice, the State 
must have effective control of the principal means of production”.13 
However, nationalisation of the major means of production did not improve 
production or efficiency.14 Consequently, by the early 1970s serious economic problems had 
started to appear.15 Shortages of imported foodstuffs, industrial inputs and consumer 
durables were grave.16 The financial system was strained, thereby curtailing the ability of 
Regional Trading Corporations (RTCs) and co-operative societies to maintain the flow of 
supplies to the public and production sectors.17 
According to the Law Reform Commission of Tanzania (LRCT), “entrusting public 
servants with power of decision-making over investments and distribution in the expanding 
public sector, brought with it new avenues of corruption”.18 Public corporations and co-
operative societies started exploiting the peasants and low-level workers. Parastatal officials 
hid the goods they produced until they were offered an extra corruption price to release 
them to the needy.19 Need, rather than greed, became the motive for corruption.20 As Table 
                                                          
10 Nyerere (1967) 162-171. 
11 See Part Five of the Arusha Declaration and TANU’s Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance (1967). 
12 Resnick (1981) 108. 
13 Paragraph (h) of the Preamble to the Constitution of TANU. 
14 Heilman & Ndumbaro (2002) 5. 
15 Resnick (1981) 108. 
16 Resnick (1981) 108. 
17 Heilman & Ndumbaro (2002) 5. 
18 LRCT (2004) 9. 
19 Kasella-Bantu (1978) 26. 
20 Cooksey (2005) 5. 
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2 below illustrates, the number of corruption cases continued to increase in the seven years 
after the Arusha Declaration. 
Table 2: Corruption cases reported to the police (1968-1974) 
YEAR CASES 
REPORTED CONFIRMED AS TRUE 
1968 191 166 
1969 197 166 
1970 220 193 
1971 211 183 
1972 182 156 
1973 319 303 
1974 228 219 
Source: Shaidi (1975). 
As the problem of corruption became a threat to the stability of the economy, the 
government adopted both legislative and enforcement measures to rescue the situation. In 
March 1971, stricter exchange controls were introduced, aimed at preventing capital flight, 
tax evasion and smuggling.21 
3.2.1 Prevention of Corruption Act 
In May 1971, the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) was enacted,22 repealing and 
replacing the former Prevention of Corruption Ordinance of 1958. POCA criminalised both 
active and passive bribery.23 It also introduced the offence of illicit enrichment and a 
presumption of corruption in certain cases involving contracts with government 
authorities.24 In its operation, this law had retrospective effect. Offences committed before 
its coming into force could be prosecuted under it still.25 Investigation and prosecution of 
corruption cases in terms of POCA were charged to the police force and the DPP 
respectively. 
                                                          
21 Aminzade (2013) 231. 
22 Act 16 of 1971. 
23 Section 3 of POCA. 
24 Section 9 of POCA. 
25 Section 20(2) of POCA. 
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3.2.2 Anti-Corruption Squad 
In March 1974, Parliament enacted the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act,26 which 
established the Anti-Corruption Squad (ACS). The ACS was mandated to take all necessary 
measures to prevent corruption in the public, parastatal and private sectors.27 Also, it was 
given powers to investigate and, subject to the directions of the DPP, to prosecute 
corruption offences.28 The Director and members of the ACS were appointed by the 
President and were subject to the supervision of the Prime Minister.29 
By its establishment, the ACS took over the task that hitherto had been carried out 
by the police force, which also had become engulfed in corruption.30 However, the ACS was 
just a special department within the police force. According to the first ACS Director, the 
Squad was set to identify methods used by those who involve themselves in corrupt 
transactions.31 This implied that the ACS was concerned with tracking-down and arresting 
corrupt offenders rather than with preventing corruption. Indeed, the Warioba Report of 
1996 pointed out that previous anti-corruption measures focused on the prosecution 
instead of the prevention of corruption.32 
The ACS was limited in terms of jurisdiction and resources. Section 2A(1) of POCA 
gave the President discretion to determine the number of Assistant Directors and other 
officers of the Squad. Surprisingly, when the ACS was established in January 1975, it had 
only a Director. Lack of funds to run the Squad was stated to be the reason for not 
appointing other officers at the time.33 As a result, the ACS had to rely heavily upon the 
police force and the DPP for investigations and prosecution respectively.34 
3.2.3 Economic Crisis 
The decade of 1970 to 1980 witnessed an unprecedented economic depression in the 
country. As scarcity of commodities triggered inflationary pressures in the economy, the 
                                                          
26 Act 2 of 1974. 
27 Section 2A(3)(a) of POCA. 
28 Section 2A(3)(b) of POCA. 
29 Section 2A(2) of POCA. 
30 AfriMAP (2015) 59. See also Makaki (2004) 54. 
31 Shaidi (1975) 110. 
32 LRCT (2004) 13. 
33 Shaidi (1975) 110. 
34 Shaidi (1975) 112. 
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entire distribution system was disrupted by a few people seeking to obtain extra benefits.35 
The government responded by imposing political, legal and economic measures aimed at 
empowering the poor citizen to obtain essential needs at fair prices.36 Additionally, the 
government was “forced to ration not only foodstuffs but also petroleum”.37 
To carry out this task, the government designated particular departments and 
officials to distribute the items to the people. Citizens needed to obtain “special permits” 
(vibali) from these designated officials in order to purchase scanty items such as sugar, 
maize, wheat flour, cement and corrugated iron sheets.38 However, the legal restrictions 
placed on public servants made them invent new ways of earning extra incomes, mostly 
from corrupt dealings.39 In response, the government arrested various officials and 
prosecuted them accordingly. Table 3 below indicates the number of corruption cases 
brought before courts of law from 1980 to 1983 and their outcomes. 
Table 3: Corruption cases 1980–1983 
Year Number of Cases Persons Arrested Persons Convicted Persons Acquitted 
1980 149 174 26 58 
1981 161 183 28 31 
1982 111 126 6 9 
1983 132 167 3 — 
Source: TCCIA (1995). 
3.2.4 Anti-Economic Sabotage Legislation 
Due to the critical economic situation, the government lost its ability to provide services to 
its people and even to pay public servants their wages.40 External financial aid was reduced 
also, as most donors became unwilling to continue supporting what they considered to be 
“an unsustainable development model” embraced by the Tanzanian government.41 Decline 
of the state-controlled economy led to the emergence of an “underground economy” 
                                                          
35 Warioba Report (1996) 9. 
36 Warioba Report (1996) 9. 
37 TCCIA (1995) 15. 
38 TCCIA (1995) 15-16. 
39 Warioba Report (1996) 9. 
40 Heilman & Ndumbaro (2002) 5. 
41 Muganda (2004) 2. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
  
 
 
 
37 
characterised by economic sabotage and racketeering.42 In response, the government 
declared war on economic saboteurs and racketeers. 
The campaign against economic sabotage started during the early 1970s but was 
intensified in the 1980s. The government condemned economic sabotage as “a crime 
beyond description”.43 The Prime Minister, Edward Moringe Sokoine, led the anti-economic 
sabotage campaign and rebuked government leaders who received corrupt benefits and 
sided with black market dealers.44 In April 1983, the National Assembly passed the Economic 
Sabotage (Special Provisions) Act.45 The Act was signed into law on 4 May 1983 but had 
retroactive operation to 24 March 1983, supposedly to legitimise efforts that had been 
commenced by Sokoine. This Act reformulated corruption offences as crimes of economic 
sabotage.46 
Within a month of the enactment of the Economic Sabotage Act, 4 216 economic 
saboteurs had been arrested for currency smuggling, hoarding, and profiteering.47 The Act 
was repealed in 1984 and replaced by the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act 
(EOCCA).48 Part II of the EOCCA established the Economic Crimes Court with jurisdiction to 
hear and determine cases involving economic offences.49 Like its predecessor, the EOCCA 
brought under its purview all corruption offences identified in POCA.50 
3.3 Second Post-Independence Regime 
President Nyerere voluntarily stepped down in 1985 and Ali Hassan Mwinyi succeeded him 
as the second post-independence President of Tanzania. President Mwinyi led the country 
into economic and political liberalisation.51 Liberalisation measures were largely the result 
of external influence from donor countries and the Bretton Woods institutions. Neoliberal 
economists suggested that in order to fight corruption the state had to reduce its control 
                                                          
42 Stokke (1995) 232. 
43 Aminzade (2013) 231. 
44 Aminzade (2013) 233. 
45 Act 9 of 1983. 
46 See Schedule to the Economic Sabotage (Special Previsions) Act, 1983. 
47 Aminzade (2013) 233. 
48 Act 13 of 1984. 
49 Section 3(1) of the EOCCA. 
50 See First Schedule to the EOCCA. 
51 Brown (1998) 86. 
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over the economy.52 Thus, the government liberalised prices, trade and foreign exchange. 
Investment laws and institutions were established in order to attract foreign direct 
investment as well as local investment.53 
Businessmen and individuals who hid their funds in offshore jurisdictions “were 
allowed to import goods without even being asked about the source of their capital”.54 This 
gave businessmen more power over state organs and government ministries. As 
businessmen moved closer to public leaders, corruption increased in the public sector. By 
the early 1990s, most of the top government officials, particularly in the Ministry of Finance 
(especially the tax department), the Ministry of Lands, parastatal banks, immigration 
services, the police force, customs authorities, and the magistrates’ courts were saturated 
with corruption.55 
As corruption levels went beyond control, the government issued Presidential 
Circular No 1 of 1990 on Guidelines for Deterrence of Corruption. These Guidelines set 
“strategies to deter corruption and measures to ensure that the policies and procedures of 
the civil service would reflect the principles of transparency and accountability”.56 
Additionally, POCA was amended to transform the Anti-Corruption Squad into the 
Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB).57 The PCB focused on preventing corruption. 
However, its work was constrained by many factors, including lack of a “legal mandate or 
opportunity to follow up and prosecute corruption related to fraud”.58 Fischer argues that 
there was no political commitment from top leaders to eliminate corruption. Therefore, the 
PCB was used only to create a political legitimacy to show the international community and 
donor organisations that the country was doing something to fight corruption.59 
3.4 Third Post-Independence Regime 
In 1995, Benjamin Mkapa was elected as Tanzania’s third post-independence President. 
Mkapa had campaigned on a clean government platform, promising to fight corruption 
                                                          
52 Heilman & Ndumbaro (2002) 5. 
53 Muganda (2004) 4. 
54 Sedigh & Muganda (1999) 156. 
55 See Warioba Report (1996) 11, Sedigh & Muganda (1999) 156 and LRCT (2004) 11. 
56 Sedigh & Muganda (1999) 157. 
57 Act 20 of 1990. 
58 PCCB (accessed 9 September 2016). 
59 Fischer (2006) 417. 
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briskly. Among others, Mkapa sought to strengthen the PCB by increasing its funding and 
staff. Table 4 below indicates that from the 1996/1997 to the 1999/2000 financial year, the 
disbursed PCB funds were increased more than six-fold. Likewise, the number of staff 
increased more than three times for the years 1996/1997 to 2001/2002. 
Table 4: PCB Budget and Released Funds 1996/1997 to 2002/2003 
PCB Budget – Released funds 1996/1997 to 2002/2003  (Tsh 000) 
1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
264 034 594 853 1 395 153 1 817 283 2 964 629 3 750 277 (5 266 824) 
Number of PCB Staff  
141  181 198 212 217 537 (714) - 
Source: ESRF & FACEIT (2002). Numbers in brackets indicate approved figure or budget. 
In addition to the financial and human resources improvements, POCA was amended in 
1997 to give members of the PCB powers to arrest and detain suspects, and to seize 
property suspected of being involved in corruption. However, the PCB had to seek consent 
from the DPP for it to prosecute certain corruption cases.60 The anti-corruption agency 
condemned this provision as hindering effective prosecution of corruption cases.61 
As it gained more strength, the PCB was able to record an increase in reported, 
investigated and prosecuted cases between 1995 and 2005. As shown in Table 5 below, the 
number of reported cases increased from 261 in 1995 to 3 121 in 2005, while the number of 
prosecuted cases rose from 8 to 50 in the same period. These figures suggest two different 
conclusions. On the one hand, they imply a rise in public awareness of corruption and anti-
corruption and in people’s willingness to expose the corrupt. On the other hand, they 
suggest that anti-corruption initiatives were inefficient, thus allowing corruption to escalate. 
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Table 5: PCB Case Statistics from 1995 to 2005 
Year  Reported Investigated Completed Prosecuted Convictions  Acquittals  
1995 261 261 145 8 1 7 
1996 513 513 245 21 2 9 
1997 510 510 289 9 1 4 
1998 545 545 200 15 2 6 
1999 1 116 1 116 304 62 9 25 
2000 1 244 1 244 276 - 6 3 
2001 1 354 1 354 285 57 - - 
2002 1 384 1 384 732 52 12 26 
2003 2 285 1 796 540 60 9 28 
2004 2 223 1 149 458 60 6 8 
2005 3 121 677 540 50 6 10 
Source: Hoseah (2007). 
3.4.1 Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act 
In order to enforce ethics among public servants, the government enacted the Public 
Leadership Code of Ethics Act (PLCEA) of 1995.62 The PLCEA introduced ethical standards for 
public leaders, including the requirement to declare assets. The task of implementing the 
PLCEA was charged to the Ethics Secretariat, which is established under Article 132 of the 
Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania. Article 132(1) empowers the Ethics Secretariat 
“to inquire into the behaviour and conduct of any public leader”. The Secretariat can receive 
anonymous complaints, in oral or written form.63 After receiving a complaint, the 
Secretariat can initiate an investigation in respect of the breach of ethics concerned. 
The Ethics Secretariat is required also to receive assets declarations by public 
servants. The declarations are to be kept in a register and should be made available for 
public inspection at all reasonable times.64 The impact of assets declarations in curbing 
corruption in Tanzania is questionable, as most government leaders do not declare their 
assets. Even when they do declare their assets, there are no mechanisms for verifying the 
correctness of such declarations. 
                                                          
62 Act 13 of 1995. 
63 Section 18(3) of the PLCEA. 
64 Section 20(1) & (2) of the PLCEA. 
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3.4.2 Warioba Commission on Corruption 
In January 1996, President Mkapa formed the Presidential Commission of Inquiry on 
Corruption (the Warioba Commission) to probe the problem of corruption in the country. 
The Commission was mandated to investigate and report on the magnitude and forms of 
corruption in public services and to recommend actions necessary to eradicate this evil.65 
The Commission handed its report to the President in November 1996. 
The Warioba Report indicated that corruption was rooted deeply in and widespread 
across all sectors of the public service.66 Also, it identified the leadership vacuum as the 
main reason for the growth and spread of corruption.67 The situation was aggravated by 
problems of implementing anti-corruption laws and regulations, lack of supervision and 
accountability, and lengthy and bureaucratic procedures in obtaining public services. 
Further, state institutions mandated to fight corruption were adjudged to be weak, with 
their employees also indulging in corruption. The Commission found that the public had 
given up on reporting corruption because the leaders who ought to be fighting it themselves 
were “engulfed by corruption”.68 
In order to fight corruption, the Warioba Commission recommended that both legal 
and non-legal actions be taken. The focus of the Commission’s recommendations was to 
prevent corruption and eradicate chances for its occurrence. Thus, it recommended 
institutional reforms and the strengthening of ethics. The Commission believed that 
corruption could be eradicated by having good and ethical leaders in office. 
3.4.3 National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan 
Building on the recommendations of the Warioba Report, the government developed a 
National Framework on Good Governance (NFGG). To implement the NFGG, a National Anti-
Corruption Strategy was prepared. All government Ministries, Departments and Agencies 
(MDAs) were required to develop their own action plans for combating corruption.69 
Subsequently, the formulated action plans were integrated into the National Anti-
                                                          
65 Warioba Report (1996) 1-2. 
66 Warioba Report (1996) 10. 
67 Warioba Report (1996) 9. 
68 Warioba Report (1996) 10. 
69 Afro-Barometer & REPOA (2006) 2. 
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Corruption Strategy to form the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan 
(NACSAP). NACSAP was approved formally by Parliament in November 1999. 
NACSAP focused on prevention, law enforcement, public awareness and institution 
building.70 Specifically, NACSAP aspired to achieve the following: reforming of government 
agencies to institute financial discipline and delivery; raising public awareness in combating 
corruption; and increasing transparency, accountability and integrity in government 
business. Also, NACSAP aimed at involving civil society in the fight against corruption; co-
ordinating, monitoring and evaluating the progress of anti-corruption efforts; and enacting 
and enforcing laws aimed at fighting corruption and enhancing good governance.71 
In 2006, the second National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP II) 
was inaugurated. NACSAP II was a five-year strategy, covering 2008 to 2011. It was the anti-
corruption blueprint of the fourth post-independence government, which had come to 
power in 2005 and was led by President Jakaya Kikwete. It underscored the fact that the 
government alone cannot fight corruption effectively. Thus, NACSAP II aimed to create a 
platform where all interested parties (the private sector, civil society, the media, public 
sector institutions and individuals) could participate fully to prevent and combat 
corruption.72 Unlike NACSAP which covered only 31 MDAs, NACSAP II covered 54 MDAs, 
including the President’s Office. 
3.4 Fourth Post-Independence Regime  
A discussion of the current anti-corruption legal and institutional framework in Tanzania 
must appreciate the role played by the fourth government regime under President Jakaya 
Kikwete, who was in power from 2005 to 2015. In his first address to Parliament in 
December 2005, President Kikwete stated that he was determined to fight corruption 
“without fear or favour”.73 Indeed, the decade during which Kikwete was in power 
witnessed significant changes in anti-corruption laws and empowerment of anti-corruption 
institutions aimed at controlling corruption. Regrettably, within the same decade, there was 
a series of graft scandals involving politicians and top government officials. 
                                                          
70 URT (1999) 5. 
71 URT (1999) 5. 
72 URT (2006) 28. 
73 Speech of President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete to the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania in 
Dodoma on 30 December 2005. 
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In May 2005, a few months before Kikwete came to power, Tanzania ratified UNCAC. 
As noted earlier, UNCAC obligates States Parties to establish and implement policies and 
practices aimed at preventing and combating corruption. In discharging these obligations, 
Tanzania formulated NACSAP II, enacted laws and established oversight and law 
enforcement institutions with a view to controlling corruption. Indeed, the bulk of the 
current anti-corruption regime in Tanzania took shape during Kikwete’s tenure as President. 
3.5 Current Anti-Corruption Legal Framework 
The legal framework for fighting corruption in Tanzania comprises a set of laws established 
to regulate different sectors, including public procurement, public finance management, 
national elections, and regulation of financial institutions and the private sector. The 
intention was to put in place a comprehensive legal regime for controlling corruption in the 
public and private sectors. The key anti-corruption laws are discussed below. 
3.5.1 Anti-Money Laundering Act 
In 2006, the National Assembly passed the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA).74 This Act 
incorporated “corrupt practices” among the predicate offences that constitute offences of 
money laundering.75 The scope of “corrupt practices” was not defined explicitly by the Act, 
but it referred by implication to corruption offences criminalised under POCA. 
In 2009, the ESAAMLG “Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism in Tanzania” found that Tanzania was not complying 
to a large extent with the FATF Recommendations.76 Following this report, in 2012 Tanzania 
enacted the Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act77 which extensively amends the 
AMLA. Of interest to this study are two provisions. Firstly, the definition of predicate 
offences was amended from including “corrupt practices” to cover “all corruption and 
related offences stipulated under the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act”.78 
                                                          
74 Act 12 of 2006. 
75 Section 3 of the AMLA. 
76 ESAAMLG (2009). 
77 Act 1 of 2012. 
78 Section 3(c)(i) of the AML Amendment Act. 
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Secondly, the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) was included 
as a law enforcement agency in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.79 
The amendment meant that corruption was to be fought not only by the PCCB but also by 
other anti-money laundering agencies, since all corruption offences constitute predicate 
offences for money laundering. 
3.5.2 Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act 
In April 2007, the National Assembly passed the Prevention and Combating of Corruption 
Act (PCCA).80 The PCCA was intended to provide a holistic approach for the promotion of 
good governance and eradication of corruption in Tanzania. The PCCA repealed and 
replaced POCA. In substance, the PCCA has increased the number of corruption offences 
from four to twenty-four. These cover active and passive bribery; corrupt transactions in 
contracts, procurement, auctions and employment; bribery of foreign public officials; 
unjustified enrichment; embezzlement and misappropriation; trading in influence; 
diversion; sexual corruption; and other forms of corruption liability including aiding, 
abetting and conspiracy.81 The PCCA further provides for mechanisms for asset recovery82 
and encourages co-operation between the PCCB and other local law enforcement organs 
and private institutions.83 
3.5.3 National Elections Act and Election Expenses Act 
The Elections Act of 1985,84 which is now the National Elections Act (NEA),85 criminalised 
bribery and treating in elections.86 This included giving, procuring, lending, receiving or 
agreeing to receive, directly or indirectly, any money, gift, loan, food, drink, entertainment, 
procurement or any other valuable consideration in order to induce any voter to vote or 
refrain from voting in any election. 
                                                          
79 Section 3(a) of AML Amendment Act.  
80 Act 11 of 2007. 
81 Part III of the PCCA. 
82 Part IV of the PCCA. 
83 Part V of the PCCA. 
84 Act 1 of 1985. 
85 Cap 343 RE 2010. 
86 Sections 97 & 98 of the Elections Act, 1985. 
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Surprisingly, in 1990, all the provisions of the NEA that criminalised corruption in 
elections (Sections 96, 97, 98, 100, 102(1) and 107) were repealed.87 However, another 
amendment to the NEA was made in April 1995, via the Elections (Amendment) Act,88 to re-
enact all the corruption provisions (Sections 96, 97, 98, 100, 102 and 107) that were 
repealed under the 1990 amendment. Subsequently, in 2000, Section 98 was amended 
again through the Electoral Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act of 2000.89 The 
amendment introduced what came to be known popularly as takrima provisions.90 Section 
98(2) and (3) provided that: 
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), anything done in good faith as an act of normal or 
traditional hospitality shall be deemed not to be treating. 
(3) Normal or ordinary expenses spent in good faith in the election campaign or in the 
ordinary cause of election process shall be deemed not to be treating, bribery or illegal 
practice. 
The constitutionality of takrima provisions was challenged in the case of Legal and Human 
Rights Centre & Two Others v Attorney General.91 The petitioners in this case averred that 
takrima provisions legalised the offering, by an election candidate, of anything “as an act of 
hospitality to the candidate’s voters”. They argued that such provisions encouraged 
corruption in the election process and violated “the right against discrimination, the right to 
equality before the law and the right of the citizens of Tanzania to participate in fair and 
free elections”. In its judgment, the High Court held that takrima provisions violated the 
Constitution and ordered that the provisions be struck out of the NEA. 
Following the judgment of the High Court, in 2010 Parliament passed the Electoral 
Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act92 which repealed the whole of the bribery and 
treating provisions under Sections 97 and 98 of the NEA. In the same year, Parliament 
enacted the Election Expenses Act (EEA).93 The EEA prohibits “unfair conducts” and 
“unconscionable funding” in elections. According to Section 24(8), where a person commits 
a prohibited practice, the provisions of the NEA or those of the PCCA shall apply against him 
                                                          
87 Repealed under Section 15 of the Elections (Amendment) Act 13 of 1990. 
88 Act 9 of 1995. 
89 Act 4 of 2000. 
90 The word takrima signifies hospitality or good reception. 
91 [2006] 1 TLR 240. 
92 Act 7 of 2010. 
93 Act 6 of 2010. 
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or her. Additionally, Sections 94 and 100 of the NEA criminalise bribery and treating 
respectively. A person who commits such offences is liable, upon conviction, to a fine of not 
less than Tsh 500 000 or to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year and not more 
than three years or to both.94 
3.6 Current Anti-Corruption Institutional Framework 
Tanzania has a number of oversight institutions that, among others, have the responsibility 
to check and control corruption. The institutions are established under various statutes and 
have their primary functions as mandated by their establishing laws. However, it is the PCCB 
alone which is designated as a specialised body for preventing and combating corruption. 
3.6.1 Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau 
The PCCA transformed the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) into the Prevention and 
Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB).95 The PCCB is an independent public body96 
mandated to examine and detect corruption practices; enlist and foster public support in 
combating corruption; advise public, private and parastatal bodies on ways of preventing 
corrupt practices; and co-operate with domestic and international organisations and 
institutions in combating corruption.97 The PCCB is headed by the Director General and 
Deputy Director General who are both appointed by the President.98 Currently, the PCCB 
has four directorates: the Directorate of Investigations; the Directorate of Research, Control 
and Statistics; the Directorate of Public Education; and the Directorate of Administration 
and Human Resource Management. Also, there is a special Department for Planning, 
Monitoring and Evaluation. 
The PCCB is required to submit an annual report of its activities to the President.99 
These reports are not available readily for public consumption. Funds and resources of the 
                                                          
94 Section 94 of Cap 343. 
95 Section 5 of the PCCA. 
96 Section 5(2) of the PCCA. 
97 Section 4 & 7 of the PCCA.  
98 Section 6 of Act the PCCA. 
99 Section 14(1) of the PCCA.  
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PCCB are appropriated by Parliament after it has received a report on estimates of income 
and expenditure for the Bureau from the Minister responsible for good governance.100 
3.6.2 Controller and Auditor General 
Article 143 of the Constitution gives the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) authority to 
monitor and authorise payments made out of the Consolidated Fund. The CAG has to 
ensure that such moneys are used for the purposes authorised. Each year, the CAG has to 
audit and provide an audit report in respect of the accounts of the government, the 
accounts managed by the Clerk of the National Assembly and of all courts of the United 
Republic. 
Despite the firm legal basis and mandate of the CAG, for many years the National 
Audit Office of Tanzania (NAOT) did not present itself as an effective oversight institution as 
regards public funds. Audit reports often were delayed, sometimes for up to three years.101 
On the coming into power of President Kikwete, the NAOT was given a new impetus. In 
2008, Parliament enacted the Public Audit Act (PAA).102 The Preamble to the PAA notes that 
the discharge of the mandate of the CAG is intended to promote accountable and 
democratic institutions in the country by preventing financial malpractice and corruption.103 
The CAG has the power to disallow any public expenditure or call into question the sum 
concerned whenever it appears to it that any deficiency or loss occasioned by negligence, 
misconduct, fraud or corruption has occurred.104 
Since the enactment of the PAA, the NAOT has been an active oversight institution of 
public funds. Its reports are issued timeously and are accessible publicly.105 Various 
corruption and maladministration inquiries and investigations have been carried out since 
2008, based on the CAG reports. This includes the 2014 inquiry into the Tegeta Escrow 
account that revealed massive fraud and corruption in the transfer of public money from 
                                                          
100 Section 48 of the PCCA. 
101 Msasato (2011). 
102 Act 11 of 2008. 
103 Paragraph 2 of the Preamble to the PAA. 
104 Section 11(3)(c) of the PAA. 
105 The reports may be accessed at http://www.nao.go.tz/category/cag-reports/. 
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the Bank of Tanzania to various corporate and personal accounts of individuals and 
politicians.106 
3.6.3 Public Procurement Regulatory Authority 
In 2003, the Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) found that procurement 
system in Tanzania was over-centralised and inefficient.107 It also found that about 20 per 
cent of government expenditure on procurement was being lost through corruption by way 
of kickbacks and bogus investments.108 Consequently, the government enacted the Public 
Procurement Act of 2004.109 This Act was later repealed and replaced by the Public 
Procurement Act of 2011.110 The 2011 Act establishes the Public Procurement Regulatory 
Authority (PPRA) with powers to fight corruption and fraudulent practices in 
procurement.111 Section 83 of the Public Procurement Act prohibits persons and firms from 
engaging in corruption or fraudulent practices when competing for procurement contracts. 
If such practices have occurred, the procuring entity can reject the proposal for the award of 
a procurement contract, cancel the portion of the funds allocated to a contract, or declare 
the person or firm ineligible for a period of ten years to be awarded a public-financed 
contract. Further, the PPRA has powers to blacklist from participating in public procurement 
proceedings any tenderer who engages in fraud or corruption.112 
3.6.4 Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance 
Established under Article 129(1) of the Constitution, the Commission for Human Rights and 
Good Governance (CHRAGG) is an independent government department which exists, as its 
name suggests, for the protection of human rights and promotion of the principles of good 
governance in Tanzania. The CHRAGG replaces the Permanent Commission of Enquiry and it 
became operational on 1 July 2001, following the coming into force of the Commission for 
Human Rights and Good Governance Act (CHRAGGA).113 Thus, the CHRAGG is both the 
                                                          
106 See NAOT (2014) and Parliament of Tanzania (2014). 
107 World Bank & URT (2003) 16. 
108 World Bank & URT (2003) 23. 
109 Act 21 of 2004. 
110 Act 7 of 2011. 
111 Section 7 of the Public Procurement Act, 2011. 
112 Section 62 of the Public Procurement Act, 2011. 
113 Act 7 of 2001.  
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nation’s human rights institution and office of the ombudsman. Among others, the CHRAGG 
is mandated to: 
investigate or inquire into complaints concerning practices or actions by persons holding 
office in the service of the government, public authorities or other public bodies, including 
private institutions and individuals where those complaints allege abuse of power, injustice, 
or unfair treatment of any person in the exercise of their official duties.114 
However, the CHRAGG has no legal powers to enforce its decisions. After it has made its 
findings, the CHRAGG merely can report them to the authority responsible for the official 
who is the target of the complaint and recommend measures for effective redress.115 
3.7 Role of Donors in Fighting Corruption in Tanzania 
Tanzania’s anti-corruption programmes have received mixed donor support for the past two 
decades. Multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, and developed nations have 
supported the fight against corruption in various ways. However, a striking characteristic of 
the donor support to anti-corruption efforts is that all donors increasingly have addressed 
corruption in response to circumstances “which suggested that the development 
environment was not as positive in Tanzania as it once had been assumed”.116 These 
circumstances include “prominent grand corruption scandals, the growing media and public 
interest in corruption and reports of corruption surveys”. 117 
A key instrument of donor co-ordination has been general budget support (GBS), 
which enables donors to press for prosecution of grand corruption cases and to leverage 
public finance management reforms.118 It has been reported that Tanzania received total 
GBS of some US$3.69 billion from Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the UK between 2000 and 
2013.119 Within the same period, aid commitments from these same countries to support 
governance and civil society approximated US$860 million. 
On the one hand, the focus of donor support has been on improving governance 
systems and management of public finances. On the other hand, donors have attempted to 
strengthen the anti-corruption fight by: 
                                                          
114 Section 6(1)(g) of the CHRAGGA. 
115 Section 15(2) of the CHRAGGA.  
116 Vaillant et al (2012) 19. 
117 Vaillant et al (2012) 19. 
118 Vaillant et al (2012) xiv. 
119 See http://aiddata.org/dashboard#/agregate/analytic-dashboard (accessed 11 April 2017). 
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supporting government institutions dealing directly with corruption (mainly but not 
exclusively the PCCB); supporting governance reforms through government sector reform 
programmes and funding Civil Society Organisations to strengthen the demand for good 
governance.
120 
The Strengthening Tanzania’s Anti‐Corruption Action (STACA) programme, launched by the 
UK Department for International Development (DFID) in February 2012, is a good example 
of donor involvement in anti-corruption in Tanzania. STACA was a £11 million programme 
designed to reduce the impact of corruption on the poor in Tanzania through more active 
implementation of anti-corruption measures with a focus on high risk/high impact 
sectors.121 It was a 4½-year programme running between the 2011/12 and 2015/16 fiscal 
years. 
STACA consisted of two main elements. Firstly, it provided support to the 
government of Tanzania to improve the performance of the institutions most directly 
involved in tackling corruption (the PCCB, the DPP, the FIU and the NAOT). The programme 
aimed to make these institutions work more effectively together on the identification and 
handling of corruption risks and cases. It also addressed corruption in the police and 
Judiciary.122 Secondly, STACA effected the establishment of an Integrity Fund to provide 
support to a range of non-governmental initiatives in the field of anti-corruption.123 STACA’s 
theory of change centred on the hypothesis that corruption levels in Tanzania would decline 
if there were stronger oversight institutions, fewer opportunities and incentives to be 
corrupt, and more incentives for the government to act.124 
Generally, STACA was a complex programme that tried to solve an even more 
complex problem of institutional collaboration and trust among organs tasked with 
combating corruption in Tanzania. The programme succeeded in some areas. For example, 
the number of convictions for corruption increased from 52 in 2011 to 135 in 2014.125 The 
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121 See DFID (2012) 1. 
122 See DFID (2013) 1. 
123 DFID (2013) 1. 
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125 CMI et al (2016) 22. 
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number of suspicious transactions reports (STRs) also increased from 20 in 2011 to 144 in 
2014.126 
However, there was meagre collaboration and trust among the institutions charged 
with fighting corruption.127 This undermined the operational relevance of the programme. 
As the STACA Evaluation Report notes: 
it would be unrealistic to expect the activities under the STACA programme that have only 
been running for 2‐3 years to already change collaborative practices and trust between 
partner agencies.
128 
Success of such programmes as STACA requires longer design and implementation 
periods.129 
3.8 Fifth Post-Independence Regime 
In November 2015, John Pombe Magufuli succeeded Kikwete to become the fifth President 
of Tanzania. From the beginning, Magufuli identified himself as a leader with a zero 
tolerance policy to corruption. During campaigns, he promised to fight corruption and 
embezzlement of public resources with all his energy. In his speech at the inauguration of 
the first Parliament of his term, Magufuli identified corruption as a boil that has infected the 
country’s economic and political systems and that needed to be cut. He said: 
One thing that I forcefully stressed in my campaigns was the fight against corruption and 
embezzlement. I did not do so to lure citizens to vote for me as their president. I did so with 
zeal and what I said is exactly what I meant. ... I understand the difficulty of the war I have 
decided to fight ... but the cure for a boil is to cut it. I have decided to be a boil cutter.130 
Basically, Magufuli’s anti-corruption approach aims to restore ethics and promote 
accountability in the public service. However, little attention is given to private sector 
corruption. 
3.8.1 House Cleaning 
Magufuli began his term by dismissing or suspending various officials who were tainted with 
corruption scandals or whom he thought did not fit into his governance model. The 
                                                          
126 CMI et al (2016) 22. 
127 CMI et al (2016) 21. 
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129 CMI et al (2016) 18.  
130 Speech of President John Pombe Magufuli at the inauguration of the New Parliament in Dodoma on 
20 November 2015. 
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President’s crackdown on tax evasion cost the jobs of the Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA) 
Director General, Mr Awadh Massawe, and of the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) 
Director General, Mr Rished Bade, among the dozens of officials fired at the two agencies 
within one month of Magufuli’s taking office.131 
The rate of corruption and tax evasion discovered at the TRA and TPA annoyed 
Magufuli to the extent that he sacked the PCCB Director General, Dr Edward Hoseah. In a 
press statement, the Chief Secretary, Ombeni Sefue, explained that: 
President Magufuli [was] disappointed that despite reports of tax evasion and other 
irregularities at TRA and TPA, the PCCB as a responsible organ to fight corruption [had] just 
kept quiet and watched the country lose a lot of revenue.132 
Magufuli’s anti-corruption crackdown has been felt by almost all government institutions. 
He has cut down what he calls “unnecessary expenditure” in all government institutions. 
There has been a nationwide vetting of all public servants to identify “ghost workers”. In 
September 2016, the Minister for Public Service Management and Good Governance, 
Angella Kairuki, announced that between 1 March 2016 and 20 August 2016 “a total of  
16 127 ghost workers had been removed from the government payroll”.133 According to 
Kairuki, their removal saves the government around Tsh16 billion in monthly salaries.134 
3.8.2 Establishing the Anti-Corruption Court 
During his presidential campaign, Magufuli had promised to establish a special court to deal 
with corruption crimes. In fact, the President believes that the Judiciary has a crucial role to 
fulfil in fighting corruption. During Law Day celebrations on 5 February 2016, Magufuli 
instructed the Treasury to release Tsh12.5 billion within five days to the Judiciary for it to 
repair its infrastructure. In return, the Judiciary was expected to deliver judgments in more 
than 400 pending tax evasion cases.135 Magufuli said that the government would recover 
over Tsh1 trillion from these cases.136 
                                                          
131 allAfrica (17 December 2015). 
132 allAfrica (17 December 2015). 
133 Wandiba (9 September 2016). 
134 Wandiba (9 September 2016). 
135 Mesomapya (6 February 2016). 
136 Mesomapya (6 February 2016). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
  
 
 
 
53 
In an attempt to ensure that corruption is fought more effectively, Parliament 
passed the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act of 2016137 which amended the 
Economic and Organised Crime Control Act.138 The amendment establishes the Corruption 
and Economic Crimes Division of the High Court (the Anti-Corruption Court) with jurisdiction 
to hear and determine corruption and economic offences as stipulated in the First Schedule 
to that Act. The Anti-Corruption Court sat for the first time on 3 November 2016, almost 
three months after its establishment, to hear a bail application.139 Hitherto, there have been 
15 miscellaneous applications filed before the Anti-Corruption Court. A real corruption or 
economic crimes case yet is to be brought before this court. 
3.8.2 Surprise Visits 
One of the methods used by President Magufuli to monitor performance in various 
institutions has been “surprise visits”. On 6 November 2015, just the day after he was sworn 
into office, Magufuli paid a surprise visit to the Ministry of Finance where he found that 
most officials were not at their work stations.140 Three days later, on 9 November 2015, 
Magufuli made another surprise visit, this time to Muhimbili National Hospital where he was 
annoyed with the poor services provided by the hospital and decided to dissolve the 
hospital board of trustees.141 The President also has made further surprise visits to other 
public institutions, including the Bank of Tanzania in March 2016 and the Julius Nyerere 
International Airport in May 2016 and February 2017. 
Surprise visits have not been carried out by Magufuli only. This style has been 
adopted by other top government officials, including Prime Minister Kassim Majaliwa. On 27 
November 2015, Majaliwa made a surprise visit to the Dar es Salaam harbour and 
discovered that more than 300 cargo containers had been moved illegally out of the port 
without the proper taxes being paid.142 Not more than a week later, Majaliwa paid a second 
surprise visit to the same harbour and discovered that another 2 431 cargo containers had 
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been smuggled out of the port in the same way.143 Majaliwa’s surprise visits to the harbour 
cost the jobs of dozens of employees at the TPA and the TRA. Surprise visits by political 
leaders were a big issue in 2016 but they have decreased over time, with almost none 
featuring in the news recently. 
3.9 Concluding Remarks 
Tanzania has taken a wide range of both policy and legal measures to fight corruption. 
Throughout the five post-independence government regimes laws have been established 
and institutions put in place with a view to controlling corruption. The first government 
regime fought corruption through its socialist policies and by extending government control 
over major means of production. The second government regime opted to liberalise trade 
and economic sectors as means to revamp the economy and reduce corruption in the public 
sector. The third government regime used a multi-faceted approach by enacting laws and 
strengthening anti-corruption institutions. The fourth government regime expanded the 
scope of anti-corruption laws and re-energised anti-corruption institutions. The fifth 
government regime is undertaking various measures aimed at restoring ethics in the public 
service and eliminating corruption. 
However, levels of corruption are still high. This implies that there are significant 
deficits in the country’s anti-corruption regime that undermine anti-corruption efforts. The 
next chapter analyses these deficiencies with a view to suggesting reforms needed to design 
a sustainable anti-corruption regime for Tanzania.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Recalibrating Aspects of the Tanzanian Anti-Corruption Regime 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Tanzania has enacted various laws aimed at fighting corruption and enhancing good 
governance. Also, it has established different institutions which are charged with the role of 
enforcing these laws. Nevertheless, the levels of corruption in the country remain high and, 
for many years, the country has been performing poorly in international corruption indices, 
including the prominent Transparency International CPI. Furthermore, Tanzanian citizens 
perceive that corruption has risen to a level where one cannot obtain a public service 
without offering a bribe.1 Clearly, the Tanzanian anti-corruption regime has failed. 
This chapter seeks to answer the second and the third research questions of this 
study: what are the deficiencies of the current legal and institutional regime in fighting 
corruption in Tanzania; and what reforms are needed in order to create a sustainable anti-
corruption regime for Tanzania? The chapter begins by exploring anti-corruption best 
practices from three territories which have managed to control corruption, namely, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Botswana. Thereafter, the chapter examines the deficiencies of the 
current Tanzanian anti-corruption regime. Finally, it proposes reforms that are needed in 
order to create a sustainable anti-corruption regime for Tanzania. 
This study argues that Tanzania has failed to operationalise its anti-corruption 
regime in keeping with its declared desire to eradicate corruption. Anti-corruption laws and 
policies have been formulated without the will to enforce and advance them. Therefore, the 
study proposes broad reforms of the anti-corruption framework in Tanzania with a view to 
creating an environment for generating a sustainable political will to pursue and promote 
anti-corruption work. 
4.2 Anti-Corruption Best Practices from Other Jurisdictions 
Some commentators hold the view that anti-corruption strategies cannot be imported from 
other jurisdictions.2 Basically, their argument is that the context in which an anti-corruption 
regime has to operate prohibits such importation. The United Nations Development 
                                                          
1 Camargo & Rivera (2015) 259. 
2 UNDP (2005) 4. See also DFID (2007) 1 as cited in De Speville (2010) 61. 
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Programme (UNDP) specifically claims that there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach to anti-
corruption and that the different contexts in which corruption manifests imply that what 
has worked in one country may not work in the other.3 However, it is accepted that best 
practices exist and that these can serve as guidelines for developing national anti-corruption 
strategies.4 
Accordingly, this study explores the anti-corruption best practices from Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Botswana as standards against which to understand the deficiencies of the 
Tanzanian anti-corruption regime. These territories have been chosen due to the proximity 
of their anti-corruption contexts to the Tanzanian context. The Hong Kong model is followed 
by many developing countries, including Botswana which has the best performance in anti-
corruption in Africa.5 Indeed, the initial design of the Tanzanian anti-corruption bureau was 
based on Hong Kong’s Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC).6 Singapore and 
Tanzania have similar political backgrounds. Both were under the British colonial rule until 
their independence in 1960s and, in each country, the post-independence governments 
have been led by one political party. Botswana is important because it provides an 
encouraging African experience in fighting corruption. 
4.2.1 Hong Kong 
Before 1974, Hong Kong featured among those territories with the worst corruption levels 
in world.7 Bribery was necessary in order to get things done.8 However, the situation 
changed radically after the establishment of ICAC in 1974. ICAC has managed to transform 
public perception in Hong Kong from corruption as way of life into corruption as a high-risk 
crime.9 Currently, Hong Kong is one of the best performers in anti-corruption. It ranks 15th in 
the Transparency International CPI for 2016. 
ICAC adopts a three-pronged strategy in fighting corruption, namely, investigation, 
prevention and community education. The three elements are applied together, at the same 
                                                          
3 UNDP (2005) 4. 
4 De Speville (2010) 61. 
5 De Speville (2010) 48. 
6 Hoseah (2010) 17. 
7 De Speville (2010) 48. 
8 Wing-chi (2013) 240 
9 Manion (2004) 28-30. 
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time and in co-ordination.10 In accordance with its strategy, ICAC consists of three major 
departments: the Operations Department, the Corruption Prevention Department and the 
Community Relations Department. 
Operations 
The Operations Department is ICAC’s enforcement unit. It works on detecting and 
investigating corruption with a view to prosecution.11 Considering its role, the Operations 
Department is the largest of the ICAC departments.12 ICAC allocates about 70 per cent of its 
resources to this department. Its logic is that “any successful anti-corruption regime must 
start with effective law enforcement against major targets”.13 Staff of the Operations 
Department consists of professional investigators, intelligence experts, computer experts, 
accountants and lawyers.14 
ICAC’s enforcement strategy may be divided into four legs. The first is an effective 
public complaints management system designed to encourage corruption reporting by 
citizens and referrals from other public and private institutions.15 The second is a prompt 
response system to deal with complaints. ICAC has a 24-hour reporting centre with an 
investigative team ready to be called into action.16 The third leg maintains a zero tolerance 
policy towards corruption. ICAC does not discriminate between petty and grand corruption. 
As long as there is suspicion, all corruption reports will be investigated properly.17 Where 
the report falls outside the mandate of ICAC, it will be forwarded to the responsible organ.18 
If a complaint is about a non-corruption offence but there is suspicion that the offence was 
facilitated by corruption, ICAC will investigate it thoroughly in an effort to uncover the 
underlying corruption.19 Fourthly, there is a review system to ensure that every complaint 
has been investigated comprehensively and professionally. 
 
                                                          
10 De Speville (2010) 53. 
11 Manion (2004) 36. 
12 Manion (2004) 37. 
13 Wing-chi (2013) 251. 
14 Man-wai (2006) 199. 
15 Man-wai (2006) 199. 
16 Man-wai (2006) 199.  
17 De Speville (2010) 55. 
18 De Speville (2010) 55. 
19 De Speville (2010) 55. 
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Corruption Prevention 
ICAC is mandated statutorily to “examine the practices and procedures of government 
departments and public bodies and to secure the revision of methods of work or procedures 
which may be conducive to corrupt practices”.20 Also, it is required to provide corruption 
prevention assistance when so requested by any member of the public or a private 
institution.21 These duties are discharged by the Corruption Prevention Department. Among 
others, the Department minimises corruption risks by studying and identifying corruption 
loopholes and proposing necessary reforms.22 Further, it funds studies and conducts 
workshops with public and private organisations on means to reduce corruption 
opportunities. Additionally, it reviews laws and regulations on the basis of findings from its 
studies with the aim of suggesting revisions.23 
The methodology of prevention used by ICAC involves enhancing internal controls, 
promoting staff integrity and propriety, and ensuring the presence of checks and balances in 
organisational structures. It also involves enhancing transparency and accountability, and 
promoting ethics and codes of conduct.24 ICAC’s prevention strategy centres on speed and 
simplicity. Prevention measures are unacceptable if they result in slower delivery or 
operational complications.25 ICAC interprets efficiency and prevention as two sides of the 
same coin. As a result, the prevention strategy is designed to enhance good governance and 
eliminate bureaucratic red-tape.26 
Community Relations 
ICAC has managed to change public perceptions from tolerating corruption as way of life to 
fighting it. Currently, members of the public are willing not only to report corruption, but 
also to identify themselves in doing so.27 This achievement results from the pro-active work 
of the Community Relations Department. The Department educates the public about the 
evils of corruption in order to enlist their support and collaboration in fighting corruption.28 
                                                          
20 ICAC (2016) 1. 
21 ICAC (2016) 1. 
22 Wing-chi (2013) 244. 
23 Heilbrunn (2004) 4. 
24 Man-wai (2006) 199.  
25 De Speville (2010) 59. 
26 De Speville (2010) 59. 
27 Man-wai (2006) 196. 
28 Man-wai (2006) 198. 
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It conducts community-based education programmes through the mass media and outreach 
activities. And it undertakes sector-specific education programmes for groups such as 
business entities, professional bodies, technical personnel and the youth.29 
Community support for ICAC has increased tremendously. Its annual opinion surveys, 
conducted by independent research agencies, indicate that 97 per cent of Hong Kong 
citizens support ICAC.30 Its popularity results not only from education programmes but also 
from having friendly and protective whistleblower structures. ICAC makes sure to remove 
any difficulties in reporting corruption. Firstly, the complaint can be made anonymously via 
phone, letter, email or personal visit. Secondly, ICAC makes it clear that it is not interested 
in the motive of the reporter, and that spite or revenge is immaterial.31 Thirdly, ICAC 
requires neither supporting evidence nor reasonable grounds for suspicion.32 The only 
requirement is that the reporter believes that the suspicion could be true. Malicious 
reporters are discouraged by the fact that it is a criminal offence to make a false complaint 
knowingly.33 Fourthly, ICAC assures the public that complaints will be treated in strict 
confidence.34 Likewise, the law prevents from being revealed in court the identity of an 
informer who is not called as a witness.35 Fifthly, it is an offence to threaten, intimidate or 
otherwise act against an informer or a witness.36 
Review Mechanisms 
A unique feature of the Hong Kong strategy is its system of checks and balances. ICAC is 
accountable directly to the Chief Executive. Consequently, the ICAC Commissioner reports 
to the Executive Council.37 There is an Independent Complaints Committee that receives 
complaints made by the public against ICAC or its staff.38 Also, ICAC has an internal 
monitoring unit that investigates all allegations of corruption or misconduct by ICAC staff.39 
                                                          
29 Wing-chi (2013) 255. 
30 ICAC (2016) 2. 
31 De Speville (2010) 57. 
32 De Speville (2010) 57. 
33 De Speville (2010) 57. 
34 De Speville (2010) 57. 
35 De Speville (2010) 57. 
36 De Speville (2010) 57. 
37 Wing-chi (2013) 254. 
38 Man-wai (2006) 200. 
39 Wing-chi (2013) 254. 
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ICAC operations are overseen by four independent committees comprising members 
from different sectors of the community. The Advisory Committee on Corruption advises 
ICAC on broad policy issues.40 The other three committees deal with the three ICAC 
departments. The Operations Department is reviewed by the Operations Review 
Committee, whose members come largely from the private sector.41 The Committee 
evaluates every report of corruption and the investigation conducted in order to ensure that 
there is no “whitewashing” in the handling of complaints.42 It publishes an annual report to 
be tabled before Parliament, thus ensuring transparency and accountability.43 It also creates 
confidence in the public that complaints have been handled properly. 
The Corruption Prevention Department is reviewed by the Corruption Prevention 
Advisory Committee which oversees the department in enhancing practices and procedures 
aimed at reducing corruption opportunities.44 The Citizens Advisory Committee on 
Community Relations advises the Community Relations Department on measures for 
promoting public support. It exercises a crucial role in reviewing and monitoring the 
contents of billboards, TV programmes and all sorts of advertisements used for public 
education.45 
Adequate Resources 
The Hong Kong government translates its political will to fight corruption into financial 
support. Arguably, “ICAC is one of the most expensive anti-corruption agencies in the 
world”.46 For instance, in 2000, ICAC’s budget was equivalent to US$90 million and it had 
around 1 200 staff.47 Recently, the budget has increased to US$100 million with the number 
of staff rising to about 1 300.48 ICAC is not part of the public service and its officers enjoy 
salaries higher than their counterparts of similar rank in the public service.49 De Speville 
                                                          
40 Wing-chi (2013) 254. 
41 Wing-chi (2013) 254. 
42 Wing-chi (2013) 254. 
43 Man-wai (2006) 200. 
44 Wing-chi (2013) 254. 
45 Heilbrunn (2004) 5. 
46 Man-wai (2006) 200. 
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48 Wing-chi (2013) 255. 
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argues that for any anti-corruption approach to succeed there must be investment of 
substantial resources in the effort.50 
4.2.2 Singapore 
Corruption was a way of life in Singapore at the time of British colonial rule.51 Changes 
began after the coming into power of the People’s Action Party (PAP) in 1959. According to 
Quah, the newly-elected PAP government realised that in order to ensure Singapore’s 
development, corruption had to be controlled.52 Accordingly, “PAP leaders designed a 
comprehensive anti-corruption strategy by enacting the Prevention of Corruption Act 
(POCA) of 1960 and strengthening the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB)”.53 The 
CPIB was established in 1952 by the British colonial government but its role became more 
prominent in the 1960s under the PAP government. PAP has been the ruling political party 
in Singapore since independence and its leaders are acknowledged for their commitment to 
fighting corruption.54 
Singapore adopts a three-pronged strategy in fighting corruption, involving 
legislation, enforcement and adjudication.55 POCA is the main anti-corruption statute and 
the CPIB is charged with the role of enforcing it. Like ICAC’s, the CPIB’s enforcement 
approach does not differentiate between petty and grand corruption. It pursues every 
corruption allegation regardless of the value involved.56 After investigation, the CPIB 
forwards the cases to the Public Prosecutor for prosecution.57 With regard to adjudication, 
the Judiciary in Singapore is determined to create “a regime of punishment that is deterrent 
enough to hit home the maxim that corruption does not pay”.58 
Singapore’s anti-corruption strategy enjoys strong backing from the government. 
The PAP government demonstrates its political will to fight corruption by consistently 
                                                          
50 De Speville (2010) 65. 
51 Quah (1995) 391.  
52 Quah (2001) 32. 
53 Quah (2001) 32. 
54 Quah (2016) 19. 
55 Yak (2003) 2. 
56 Quah (2016) 21. 
57 Yak (2003) 4. 
58 Yak (2003) 5. 
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amending POCA in response to changing corrupt practices and by supporting the CPIB in 
terms of human and financial resources.59 The PAP government follows the logic that: 
since corruption is caused by both the incentives and opportunities to be corrupt, attempts 
to eradicate corruption must be designed to minimise or remove the conditions of both the 
incentives and opportunities that make individual corrupt behaviour irresistible.60 
To implement its “logic of corruption control”, the PAP government began by strengthening 
anti-corruption legislation and the anti-corruption agency. This was aimed at reducing 
opportunities for corruption and increasing the penalties for corrupt behaviour.61 POCA 
criminalises both active and passive bribery. It also introduces a presumption of corruption 
in certain cases involving public servants.62 When the gratification involved in corruption is a 
sum of money or if the value of said gratification can be assessed, POCA empowers courts to 
order the receiver of the bribe to pay an amount which is equal to the amount of the 
gratification.63 This punishment is imposed in addition to other forms of punishment that 
the court might impose on the offender. 
The PAP government has empowered the CPIB with operational autonomy to 
investigate corruption against anyone in Singapore, regardless of his or her status or 
political affiliation.64 In this regard, between 1966 and 2016, the CPIB managed to 
investigate five PAP leaders who were involved in corruption allegations.65 In 1984, the 
Minister for National Development, Teh Cheang Wan, committed suicide 12 days after being 
interrogated by senior CPIB officers.66 These events have sustained the CPIB’s reputation for 
impartiality and have attracted generous public support for the Bureau. 
In trying to prevent corruption, the CPIB “examines practices and procedures of 
government departments” in order to identify corruption-prone areas and devise counter-
measures.67 This role is carried out by the research unit of the CPIB.68 The unit analyses 
administrative weaknesses and work procedures that lead to corruption in government 
                                                          
59 Quah (2016) 19. 
60 Quah (1995) 394 
61 Quah (2001) 32. 
62 Section 8 of POCA (Singapore). 
63 Section 13(1) of POCA (Singapore). 
64 Quah (2016) 21. 
65 Quah (2016) 22. 
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departments. It also reviews completed cases with a view to ascertaining the modus 
operandi of corrupt officials and proposing measures to seal any loopholes.69 
The government of Singapore has committed to improving the salaries and working 
conditions of public servants as a way of reducing incentives for corruption. The PAP 
government believes that if public servants are underpaid they will succumb to temptation 
and indulge in corruption.70 Accordingly, the 1994 salary revisions in Singapore raised the 
salary level of senior civil servants to the extent that they are amongst the most highly paid 
public servants in the world.71 
Considered a whole, Singapore’s anti-corruption strategy consists of two arms. On 
the one hand, it uses POCA and the CPIB to eliminate opportunities for corruption. On the 
other hand, it encompasses the government’s will to remove incentives for corruption 
among public servants by improving salaries and working conditions. 
4.2.3 Botswana 
Botswana is the only African nation that has achieved an enhanced performance in anti-
corruption over the past two decades. Since first featuring in the Transparency International 
CPI in 1998, Botswana has retained its position as the nation with the lowest perceived 
corruption levels across the African continent. The country is acknowledged for its relatively 
good governance, discreet economic management and sustained democratic process.72 
However, like other African nations, Botswana has been rocked by a number of corruption 
scandals.73 Sebudubudu argues that international corruption ratings for Botswana have 
been conservative and that citizens’ perceptions allege a serious increase of corruption in 
the country.74 Be that as it may, Botswana is a good example of anti-corruption best practice 
in the African region. 
For many years after its independence in 1966, Botswana enjoyed a democratic 
society characterised by low levels of corruption.75 The trend changed in the early 1990s 
when a series of graft scandals were uncovered. The major ones were the land and housing 
                                                          
69 Quah (1995) 397. 
70 Quah (2001) 33. 
71 Quah (2001) 34. 
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73 See Ogwang (2007) 35 and Mwamba (2013) 67-68. 
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allocation scandals involving senior government officials and politicians.76 In response to 
these scandals, the government of Botswana enacted the Corruption and Economic Crime 
Act (CECA) of 1994 which established the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime 
(DCEC). The DCEC was constituted along the lines of the ICAC model and is responsible for 
fighting corruption in Botswana.77 Thus, the DCEC employs a three-pronged strategy 
comprising investigation, corruption prevention and public education. 
Investigation 
The investigation department of the DCEC has various teams consisting forensic experts, 
financial investigators, construction and engineering experts and covert operations 
experts.78 According to Section 6 of CECA, the DCEC has powers to investigate any alleged or 
suspected offence under CECA or contravention of any provisions of the fiscal and revenue 
laws of Botswana. The DCEC is authorised to investigate the conduct of any person who, in 
the opinion of the Director, may be connected to corruption.79 If, after investigation, it 
appears to the Director of the DCEC that an offence has been committed, he refers the 
matter to the DPP for prosecution.80 
Corruption Prevention 
The DCEC implements a preventive strategy aimed at detecting and sealing loopholes that 
create opportunities for corruption in the public and private sectors.81 It examines and 
analyses practices and procedures of government departments, parastatals and other public 
and private bodies to identify corruption-prone areas and recommends appropriate 
measures for reducing corruption opportunities.82 For efficiency, the DCEC gives priority to 
high-risk organisations and to those which are party to large government contracts.83 
The corruption prevention strategy includes the use of assignment studies, 
workshops and seminars, and the secondment of DCEC officers to government departments 
and Ministries. Via assignment studies, the DCEC conducts thorough examinations of laws, 
                                                          
76 See Ogwang (2007) 36 and Sebudubudu (2013) 11. 
77 Kuris (2013) 1. 
78 Kuris (2013) 12. 
79 Section 6(d) of CECA. 
80 Section 39 of CECA. 
81 Mwamba (2013) 74. 
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policies and organisational structures governing certain institutions to identify weaknesses 
and propose methods for improvement.84 Through workshops and seminars, the DCEC 
meets with stakeholders from different cadres in order to familiarise and capacitate them 
with corruption prevention techniques. The aim is to promote principles of good 
governance and corruption risk assessments.85 Also, the DCEC deploys its officers to 
government departments and Ministries with a view to building internal anti-corruption 
capacity and evaluating the effectiveness of existing anti-corruption methods.86 
Public Education 
Section 6(i) and (j) of CECA mandates the DCEC to educate the public about the evils of 
corruption in order to enlist and foster their support in fighting it. Thus, the DCEC conducts 
education programmes for public servants, the youth and the general public.87 Since 2010, 
the DCEC, in co-operation with the Botswana Ministry of Education, has integrated 
corruption and anti-corruption studies into the school curriculum.88 For instance, the Rra 
Boammaruri campaign aims at instilling primary school pupils with ethics and moral 
uprightness, already at their tender age.89 Also, anti-corruption clubs have been formed to 
educate young people on the evils of corruption and to engage them in educating their 
peers.90 Further, the DCEC has cultivated a co-operative relationship with the media. The 
media are considered to be an important source of intelligence in uncovering corruption.91 
The DCEC maintains an effective whistleblower system that encourages the public to 
report corruption. It receives both anonymous and sourced corruption complaints via 
emails, telephone calls and personal visits.92 Moreover, it culls corruption reports from the 
media and receives referrals from other government agencies.93 According to Kuris, public 
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education campaigns combined with the DCEC’s intelligence capabilities have led to useful 
corruption reports followed by successful prosecutions.94 
4.3 Lessons from Hong Kong, Botswana and Singapore  
Hong Kong, Singapore and Botswana have managed to control corruption in their respective 
jurisdictions. Their experiences are relevant to other countries struggling to fight corruption, 
including Tanzania. Bearing in mind their different contexts, a number of lessons may be 
learnt from Hong Kong, Singapore and Botswana in attempting to formulate a sustainable 
anti-corruption regime for Tanzania. 
Firstly, political will from government leaders is an indispensable aspect of fighting 
corruption. When political leaders are weak on corruption, the entire anti-corruption system 
is doomed to failure. Government leaders must demonstrate exemplary leadership and 
“they should not indulge in corruption themselves”.95 Whoever is accused of corruption 
should be investigated and, if necessary, prosecuted, regardless of his social status or 
political affiliation. There should be no distinction between the small and big fish. Political 
will must be sustained across successive government regimes. The legal system must 
eliminate deficiencies that can break the chain of sustainability in fighting corruption. 
Secondly, an anti-corruption agency (ACA) should have sufficient legal autonomy to 
perform its functions. The ACA should be independent of any undue interference from 
politicians or other government organs. When the ACA’s autonomy is inadequate, the risk of 
breaking the chain of sustainability in fighting corruption increases. For example, in 
countries where the Director of the ACA is appointed by the head of the Executive and the 
ACA is directly accountable to the latter, the chain of sustainability is broken easily when the 
latter is corrupt and has immunity from prosecution. A special feature that has bolstered 
anti-corruption efforts in the three territories discussed above is the autonomy of their 
ACAs. ICAC, the DCEC and the CPIB have legal powers to investigate corruption against 
anyone in their respective jurisdictions. This assures the public that the rule of law and the 
fight against corruption continue, regardless of who is heading the government. 
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The ACA itself must be incorruptible. It must be staffed with honest and competent 
personnel. In order to reduce incentives for corruption, staff of the ACA must be 
remunerated adequately. Also, it is necessary to put in place a rigorous disciplinary system 
for staff of the ACA. Internal controls must be effective to ensure that ACA staffers do not 
indulge in corruption. 
Thirdly, legislation and enforcement should make corruption a high-risk and low-
reward activity. Legislation and enforcement form the basic components of any anti-
corruption strategy. Weaknesses in either undermine the effectiveness of the anti-
corruption regime. Similarly, laws must be enforcement-friendly. Enforcement agencies, 
including the ACA, the prosecution agency and the Judiciary should be resourced sufficiently 
and empowered to ensure that every corruption complaint is investigated, prosecuted and 
adjudicated properly. Effective enforcement is required in order to demonstrate the 
government’s commitment to eradicating corruption and to exhibiting the strength of the 
ACA. Additionally, punishment for corruption must be such as to operate as a deterrent for 
the public. 
Fourthly, an anti-corruption regime must foster and enlist public support. The public 
is the primary source of intelligence in fighting corruption. If an anti-corruption regime is to 
be sustainable, it must have the support of the public. Public support can be procured 
through education programmes and the development of close co-operation between the 
ACA and other public and private institutions. Difficulties that discourage the public from 
reporting corruption must be eliminated. This includes ensuring protection for 
whistleblowers and witnesses. 
Fifthly, incentives for corruption can be reduced by improving working conditions 
and raising salaries of public servants. Often, petty corruption results from the inability of 
public servants to live on their legitimate income. Therefore, an increase in salaries and the 
improvement of working conditions reduce their inclination towards corruption. Indeed, 
Singapore’s success in anti-corruption is attributed to its dual strategy of reducing both the 
opportunities and incentives for corruption. However, removing incentives for corruption 
depends on the country’s economic growth and financial resources. Developing countries, 
including Tanzania, likely will be unable to incorporate this element into their anti-
corruption strategy. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
  
 
 
 
68 
Finally, a system of checks and balances should be formulated to ensure 
professionalism, diligence and impartiality in the handling corruption cases. The Hong Kong 
model provides a good experience of checks and balances in anti-corruption work. It 
ensures that no corruption allegation goes unexplored. It also cautions law enforcement 
officials about the likelihood of punishment if they mishandle corruption cases. A proper 
system of checks and balances helps to guarantee efficiency and effectiveness in fighting 
corruption. 
4.4 Deficiencies of the Anti-Corruption Regime in Tanzania 
Tanzania has come a long way in the fight against corruption. Since its independence in 
1961, various measures aimed at controlling corruption have been adopted by the 
government. However, after 56 years of independence, corruption remains a threat to 
Tanzania’s social, economic and political stability. This circumstance warrants an 
examination of the deficiencies that impede the sustainability of anti-corruption efforts in 
Tanzania. 
According to Man-wai, an examination of a country’s anti-corruption regime needs 
to look into its legal, political, economic and social environments.96 Also, it must analyse the 
internal structures of the ACA in order to assess its effectiveness in fighting corruption.97 
This study considers the deficiencies of the Tanzanian anti-corruption regime in terms of its 
political, economic, legal and social context. The analysis is conducted in relation to the 
lessons from Hong Kong, Singapore and Botswana discussed above. 
4.4.1 Political Environment 
For anti-corruption efforts to be successful in any country, there must be strong political will 
supporting those efforts.98 Persson et al argue that lack of political will is a common 
characteristic of countries where corruption is rampant.99 According to Brinkerhoff, 
“political will includes the will to initiate the fight against corruption and the will to sustain it 
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until success is attained”.100  It also encompasses the will to hold corruption perpetrators 
accountable for their mischief. 
The history of the Tanzanian government’s political will to fight corruption is a mixed 
one. The first government regime is acknowledged for its commitment to fighting 
corruption. However, that is not the case with the second, third and fourth government 
regimes. A common feature of these three regimes is that, while the leaders enacted laws 
and promised clean leadership, their anti-corruption efforts ultimately ended up being 
entangled in the very corrupt networks that they were meant to fight. The fifth government 
regime has been in power for one-and-a-half years and has demonstrated its commitment 
to fighting corruption. However, it is too early to predict whether or not that commitment 
will last throughout its term. 
Tanzania’s deficit of political will is not about the initiation of anti-corruption 
strategies but about persistence with those strategies in order to make them successful. The 
middle three of Tanzania’s five government regimes all established anti-corruption systems 
but lacked the will to sustain them. For instance, President Mwinyi removed from cabinet 
the Minister for Home Affairs, Augustine Mrema, after Mrema publicly accused the Mwinyi 
administration of perpetuating corruption.101 Likewise, President Mkapa, who was the first 
to declare his assets when he assumed office in 1995, was not prepared to do so at the end 
of his term in 2005. A journalist of Rwandan origin, but who was born and lived in Tanzania, 
almost lost his citizenship after he challenged Mkapa to declare his assets upon leaving 
office.102 Similarly, President Kikwete accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Edward 
Lowassa after Lowassa was implicated in the Richmond saga but the President did not 
demand further investigation against him. 
The deficit of political will in Tanzania may be ascribed to two factors. The first 
concerns the absence of a constitutional anchor for fighting corruption and the immunity 
from prosecution afforded to the President. Article 46(1) and (3) of the Constitution of the 
United Republic of Tanzania prohibits the instigation of any criminal proceedings 
“whatsoever” against the President during and after his term for anything he did in his 
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capacity as President. Criminal charges can be instituted only if the President left office after 
impeachment by the National Assembly.103 
Further, the Constitution contains only a single provision that obligates state 
authorities to direct their policies towards eradication of corruption.104 Regrettably, this 
provision is not part of the “justiciable” provisions of the Constitution. Under this 
constitutional structure, Presidents of Tanzania have wide discretion in fighting corruption. 
There is always a risk that Presidents may abuse their positions without fear of being 
prosecuted. The threat of impeachment by Parliament is negligible, especially in the current 
situation where the ruling party has the majority of the MPs and the President is the party’s 
chairperson. 
Tanzania has been undergoing a process of constitutional review aimed at adopting 
a new Constitution. The Proposed Constitution of 2014 contains a number of provisions 
which require the government to fight corruption in elections, public procurement, and in 
all decisions of public interest.105 Specifically, article 94(4)(d) of the Proposed Constitution 
empowers the National Assembly to pass a resolution to impeach the President if he is 
accused of corruption. However, despite containing more anti-corruption provisions, the 
Proposed Constitution retains the immunity of Presidents from prosecution and fails to 
eliminate the deficits of the current Constitution with regard to fighting corruption. 
Secondly, the deficit of political will is a result of the single-party hegemony in the 
country. The Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has been in power since 1961. Over the years, 
the party has established clientelistic networks that have supported its stay in power.106 
These include networks of its financial supporters, most of whom are part of the commercial 
elite.107 In this connection, Gray argues that grand corruption in Tanzania is linked heavily to 
the nature of elite politics within the ruling CCM party.108 No wonder the study by Camargo 
& Rivera on public attitudes towards corruption in Dar es Salaam found that the “ruling 
party is perceived as having the least impact on community wellbeing”.109 
                                                          
103 Articles 46(3) & 46A(10) of the Constitution. 
104 Article 9(h) of the Constitution. 
105  Articles 8(2)(h), 12(2)(a), 27(2)(b), 94(4)(d), 209(2)(d)(ii), 256(2)(d) of the Proposed Constitution, 2014. 
106 Croke (2017) 197. 
107 Whitehead (2012) 1101. 
108 Gray (2015) 385. 
109 Camargo & Rivera (2015) 265. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
  
 
 
 
71 
Parliament is an important organ in creating the correct political environment for 
fighting corruption in a country. Apart from enacting laws, Parliament must hold 
accountable the executive arm of government for fighting corruption.110 Members of 
Parliament (MPs) must dissociate themselves from corrupt practices and must promote the 
fight against corruption in their constituencies.111 Further, Parliament has to ensure that 
adequate resources are allocated to the fight against corruption. 
Despite its growing interest in demanding accountability from the Executive, the 
Tanzanian Parliament has not supported fully the fight against corruption. On the one hand, 
Parliament has failed to demand investigation of MPs and politicians who have been 
implicated in various corruption scandals. For instance, the MP for Bariadi constituency, 
Andrew Chenge, was implicated in the BAE radar scandal and later in the Escrow scandal, 
but no investigation for corruption has been carried out against him. On the other hand, 
Parliament has failed to hold accountable the Executive for failing to investigate grand 
corruption allegations. It has failed also to exercise effective oversight of the PCCB. Section 
48(1) of the PCCA requires the Minister responsible for good governance to table before 
Parliament an annual report on the performance of the PCCB. However, Parliament appears 
to be reluctant to hold accountable the PCCB, despite the frequent corruption allegations 
raised by MPs against politicians and public officials. 
4.4.2 Legal Environment 
Tanzania has a broad legal framework for fighting corruption. The PCCA is the major anti-
corruption law. It is supplemented by other laws that regulate conduct and criminalise 
corrupt practices in other sectors, including the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Public 
Procurement Act, the Public Audit Act, the Election Expenses Act and the National Elections 
Act. 
Notwithstanding these legislative resources, the organs charged with law 
enforcement lack independence and are disappointingly weak in fighting corruption. For 
instance, the PCCB Director-General and the Deputy Director-General are appointed by the 
President and POCA does not specify qualifications for holders of these positions. Further, 
these two senior anti-corruption officials have no security of tenure and are accountable 
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directly to the President. Arguably, the operation and strength of the PCCB depend upon the 
will of the President to fight corruption. Former PCCB Director-General, Edward Hoseah, 
explains the dilemma in which the ACA’s leaders find themselves: 
As Heads of ACAs either they persevere with high-level investigations and bold reforms that 
are required to be taken to escalate the level of awareness and engagement of the society 
they live in, and by so doing they are risking their positions and constantly face the crippling 
pushback or potential dissolution of the ACAs they lead. Or they lower their sights and 
pursue unobtrusive efforts that might appear timid or biased. Either outcome imperils the 
political support or public trust ACAs need to sustain effective operations.112 
A similar situation is encountered by other good governance watchdogs in Tanzania. The 
Commissioners of the Ethics Secretariat, the CHRAGG and the CAG are all appointees of the 
President and there is no vetting of the positions by Parliament. While these positions are 
established constitutionally with security of tenure, the respective institutions have no 
powers to enforce their findings. The impact of these institutions in promoting good 
governance and accountability depends upon the will of the Executive to enforce their 
recommendations. When the Executive does not support their findings, decisions of these 
institutions remain meaningless. Lack of enforcement is caused also by mistrust and poor 
co-operation amongst government organs charged with promoting good governance and 
fighting corruption.113 
The prosecution system, too, is weak and inefficient. The PCCB can prosecute 
offences under Section 15 of the PCCA only. Section 15 criminalises passive and active 
bribery, which essentially forms the bulk of petty corruption in the country. It is in this 
connection that the Bureau has been condemned for going after the “small fish” but being 
lax on the “big fish”.114 Prosecution of other corruption offences depends upon obtaining 
consent from the DPP.115 Accordingly, high profile and grand corruption cases are 
prosecuted either by the DPP or by the PCCB with the consent of the DPP. However, 
statistics suggest that the DPP has been reluctant to grant consent for the PCCB to 
prosecute corruption cases. For instance, of 143 files referred to the DPP in 2011, consent to 
prosecute was given in only 34 cases.116 
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Ultimately, the prosecutorial fiat of the DPP weakens the anti-corruption 
enforcement project in Tanzania. Hoseah notes that by 2014 there were not more than 200 
DPP state attorneys handling all criminal cases in Tanzania, including corruption cases.117 
Further, the DPP attorneys have no special training in handling corruption cases. This 
observation is substantiated by comparing the number of acquittals and withdrawals of 
corruption cases against the number of convictions. For instance, in 2008 and 2009, the 
Resident Magistrates’ Courts and District Courts nationwide disposed of a total of 143 
corruption cases. Of these, prison sentences were imposed in 22 cases, 51 cases ended up in 
acquittals, 47 cases were withdrawn and 23 cases were discharged conditionally.118 The 
weakness of the prosecution system offers an opportunity for corruption offenders to 
operate without fear of punishment. 
The expanding arsenal of global anti-corruption efforts relies on having fair and 
impartial judicial systems for enforcement.119 However, in Tanzania, the Judiciary has not 
acquired a good reputation for fighting corruption. The Warioba Report of 1996 classified 
the Judiciary among the institutions that were engulfed heavily in corruption.120 Most of the 
citizens who appeared before the Warioba Commission expressed a lack of trust in the 
Judiciary. Similarly, the PCCB National Governance and Corruption Survey (NGCS) of 2009 
found that households ranked the Judiciary as the third most corrupt institution in Tanzania, 
after the traffic police and the police force.121 The same survey also found that the Judiciary 
was ranked as the second most ineffective institution in fighting corruption, after the police 
force.122 Without an effective and trustworthy Judiciary, law enforcement becomes defunct. 
Likewise, where judges and magistrates are corrupt, the entire justice system collapses. 
The provisions of the PCCA are inadequate as regards sanctions for corruption 
crimes. Sections 15 and 16 of the PCCA impose a minimum fine of Tsh500 000 and a 
maximum of Tsh1 million. The two sections also impose a minimum prison sentence of 
three years and a maximum of five years. Courts may impose either of the sanctions or 
both. The punishment for other offences under Sections 17 to 37 of the PCCA is inadequate 
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to deter corrupt practices. The maximum penalty for offences under any of these sections is 
imprisonment for seven years or a fine of Tsh10 million (Tsh15 million for corrupt 
transactions in procurement and auctions) or both. The sanctions are raised to a minimum 
of 20 years’ and a maximum of 30 years’ imprisonment when the offender is charged under 
the EOCCA.123 Without a minimum penalty being provided for offences under Sections 17 to 
37 of the PCCA, courts have the discretion to decide. Where the discretion is abused, the 
offender may receive a punishment which is light in proportion to the gravity of the 
offence.124 
Further, the nature of sanctions under the PCCA does not pursue sufficiently the 
liability of legal persons. Obviously, legal persons cannot be imprisoned. However, they can 
be subjected to other criminal, civil and administrative sanctions, including fines.125 The 
minimum and maximum fines imposed by the PCCA are too lenient to deter legal persons 
from engaging in corrupt practices. 
4.4.3 Economic Environment 
According to Man-wai, an examination of the economic environment for anti-corruption 
must examine the relationship that exists between poverty and corruption, the salaries of 
public servants, and the funding of anti-corruption activities.126 Literature on corruption in 
Tanzania indicates that there is a causal link between poverty or poor remuneration and the 
spreading of corruption.127 The NGCS of 2009 admitted that poverty and poor remuneration 
were the leading causes of petty corruption.128 This finding suggests that pay reforms, 
including salary increases, would reduce the levels of petty corruption in the country. 
However, studies on pay reforms in crucial sectors, such as the TRA, suggest the opposite. 
Fjeldstad examined the impact of increasing salaries to fight fiscal corruption and found that 
“even with relatively respectable salaries and working conditions, corruption may still 
thrive”.129 Similarly, Mutahaba argues that “the link between pay and corruption in Tanzania 
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is tenuous”.130 Fjeldstad and Mutahaba aver that without effective monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms, wage increases may end up being bonuses in addition to bribes 
taken by corrupt officials.131 
This study subscribes to the view held by Fjeldstad and Mutahaba. If low wages are 
to be regarded as a leading cause of petty corruption, then poor countries will be 
condemned to permanent corruption. But that is not the case. Singapore was able to 
implement the second leg of its anti-corruption strategy by improving salaries and working 
conditions in 1980s, only after attaining economic growth.132 Hong Kong has managed to 
control corruption without focusing on raising salaries of public servants.133 Therefore, it is 
submitted that corruption in Tanzania can be controlled without needing to raise salaries of 
public servants. Hence, poverty and poor remuneration are not to be considered as a 
debilitating deficiency within the Tanzanian anti-corruption regime. 
Another aspect of the economic environment for anti-corruption is the funding of 
anti-corruption activities. De Speville argues that for any anti-corruption approach to 
succeed, there must be investment of substantial resources into the effort.134 Undoubtedly, 
Hong Kong succeeded in controlling corruption after investing abundant resources into 
ICAC. According to Section 47(1) of the PCCA, the funds and resources of the PCCB are 
appropriated by Parliament upon receipt of the “estimates of income and expenditure of 
the Bureau” from the Minister responsible for good governance. Structurally, the PCCB 
operates as an institution under the President’s office. Thus, during the tabling of the 
budget before Parliament, all institutions under the President’s office are combined and 
represented in a single budget.135 Consequently, the MPs are not able to deliberate on the 
budget of the PCCB directly as it is incorporated in the general budget for the President’s 
office. Reportedly, the PCCB suffers from lack of resources and capacity to fight corruption 
effectively.136 
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4.4.4 Social Environment 
In examining the social environment for anti-corruption in Tanzania, this study considers the 
public attitudes towards corruption and the willingness of citizens to report corruption. It 
also explores public perceptions about the government’s readiness to fight corruption, the 
role of the media, and ethics education in schools and universities. 
According to the Warioba Report of 1996, corruption was rampant in the early 
1990s, to the extent that the public perceived it as a necessity for getting things done.137 
Sadly, this public perception persists two decades later. A study by Camargo & Rivera in 
2015 found that the public perceive service delivery by public institutions to be based on the 
notion of “something for something and nothing for nothing”.138 This finding is supported by 
the Tanzanian Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) which, in 2014, found that 14.8 per 
cent of respondents were of the view that corruption has become way of life in Tanzania.139 
Further, the public has a negative perception of the government’s performance in anti-
corruption. In a study by Afro-Barometer and REPOA in 2012, 66 per cent of respondents 
viewed the government’s performance in fighting corruption as very bad or fairly bad.140 
The rate dropped to 58 per cent in 2014.141 
The negative perceptions of citizens against the government undermine the 
legitimacy of public institutions charged with fighting corruption. They also discourage the 
public from reporting corruption. Afro-Barometer and REPOA’s study of 2015 reports that 
82 per cent of respondents who were compelled “to pay a bribe in order to access a public 
service” did not report the incident to the authorities.142 Factors that undermine the 
reporting of corruption include the fear of retribution from corrupt officials who have strong 
networks or power and the citizens’ ignorance of reporting procedures and systems. 
However, the most frightening factor is that citizens consider reporting as “useless” since 
culprits will not be prosecuted and the reporter may end up being victimised.143 
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Partly, the social environment described above is caused by the contradictory legal 
framework for regulating whistleblowing in Tanzania. Section 51 of the PCCA prohibits the 
disclosure of the identity of whistleblowers during court proceedings. It also introduces 
compensation for cases where the informer suffers reprisal, retaliation or victimisation.144 
However, the Whistleblower and Witness Protection Act (WWPA)145 contains provisions 
which frustrate the essence of whistleblowing. For instance, the WWPA introduces the 
concept of “reasonable belief” for reporting corruption.146 Furthermore, it requires details 
of the informer, including full names, address and occupation, to be recorded when the 
corruption complaint is made.147 Ultimately, these provisions discourage potential 
whistleblowers from reporting corruption. In a country where citizens have no trust in 
public institutions, the requirement to disclose the identity of whistleblowers is unfounded. 
Another aspect of the social environment is the role of the media. According to 
Stapenhurst, the media fight corruption by investigating and exposing corrupt officials, 
thereby prompting investigation by responsible government organs.148 Also, the media 
reinforce the work and legitimacy of anti-corruption bodies by reporting their success and 
exposing their flaws.149 To fulfil these roles, the media need to be guaranteed freedom of 
expression. 
In Tanzania, freedom of expression is guaranteed under article 18 of the 
Constitution. However, the state of freedom of expression has deteriorated steadily during 
the tenure of the fifth government regime. Press freedom has been curtailed significantly by 
the recently-enacted Media Services Act,150 the Cybercrimes Act,151 and the Statistics Act.152 
Consequently, Tanzania has performed poorly in the 2017 Press Freedom Index, which 
places it in 83rd position, down 12 positions from the previous year’s ranking.153 President 
Magufuli has been intolerant of media criticism. Repeatedly, the President has warned 
                                                          
144 Section 51(3) of the PCCA. 
145 Act 20 of 2015. 
146 Section 4(1) of the WWPA, 2015. 
147 Section 5(1) of the WWPA, 2015.  
148 Stapenhurst (2000) 4-5. 
149 Stapenhurst (2000) 6-7. 
150 Act 12 of 2016. 
151 Act 14 of 2015. 
152 Act 9 of 2015. 
153 World Press Freedom Index (2017).  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
  
 
 
 
78 
media houses to “watch out” since they do not have the “extent of freedom” that they 
claim to have.154 
Lastly, Tanzania lacks a curriculum tailored towards imparting anti-corruption 
knowledge to children and the youth. There are more than 3 000 youth anti-corruption 
clubs nationwide but their activities are not integral to the education curricula. Ethical 
studies are taught at various levels of education but focus on specific professional ethics, 
neglecting dedicated anti-corruption training. 
4.5 Reforms for a Sustainable Anti-Corruption Regime in Tanzania 
Having discussed the elements of successful anti-corruption regimes in other jurisdictions, 
and having explored the deficiencies of the current Tanzanian anti-corruption regime, the 
last research question can be answered now: what reforms are needed in order to create a 
sustainable anti-corruption regime for Tanzania? 
In answering this question, this study extrapolates from the anti-corruption 
strategies employed by Hong Kong, Singapore and Botswana and customises them to fit the 
local circumstances of Tanzania. In this regard, it takes note of the different geographical, 
social, political and economic contexts and does not attempt to import wholesale these 
foreign anti-corruption strategies into Tanzania. The proposed reforms are formulated in 
response to the Tanzanian context and are based on the specificities of the country’s anti-
corruption structures. 
4.5.1 Introducing a Constitutional Anchor 
As noted earlier, the deficit of political will in Tanzania is caused mainly by the absence of a 
constitutional anchor for fighting corruption and by the legacy of single-party domination. 
With regard to the latter, there is no straightforward solution. The problem lies within the 
party’s internal structures and requires extensive research on how its clientelistic networks 
can be overcome. Nevertheless, overcoming the constitutional deficit eventually will have 
an impact on the internal operations of political parties. 
This study proposes two reforms in order to create a sustainable political will for 
fighting corruption in Tanzania. Firstly, the Constitution should be amended to establish the 
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criminal liability of Presidents for crimes they commit while in office, including corruption. 
Such liability should cover situations where a President fails to take measures to combat 
corruption during his term. Secondly, the obligation placed on state organs to fight 
corruption should be moved to the justiciable part of the Constitution. The Constitution 
should allow citizens to sue the government where it fails to fight corruption effectively. Just 
as other rights are justiciable under the Constitution, so should be the right of citizens of 
Tanzania to live in a corruption-free country. Certainly, fighting corruption should be a 
constitutional obligation, not a policy issue. Organs charged with fighting corruption and 
promoting good governance should have the endorsement of the Constitution. 
4.5.2 Restructuring the PCCB 
In order to fight corruption successfully, the ACA needs to be fully independent. As 
discussed earlier, the PCCB’s independence in fighting corruption is inadequate. Thus, there 
is a need to restructure the PCCB in order to ensure its institutional and operational 
independence. As fighting corruption becomes a constitutional obligation, the organ 
responsible for implementing this obligation should have constitutional powers. 
Accordingly, the Constitution should be amended to re-establish the PCCB as a 
constitutional organ. Likewise, the Constitution should provide for the independence of the 
PCCB. 
The appointment of senior officials of the PCCB should be made by an independent 
appointment Secretariat, and should be based on merit and on predefined criteria. The 
appointing Secretariat should consist of Members of Parliament and civil society 
organisations in order to ensure public participation. The Constitution should provide for 
security of tenure for the PCCB’s senior officials. Again, the PCCB should have an 
independent budget which can be tabled in Parliament. 
In order to safeguard against the abuse of independence, there should be strong 
review and disciplinary mechanisms. All activities of the PCCB should be reviewed by 
independent committees. Similarly, the conduct of senior officials and staff of the PCCB 
should be vetted by an independent committee which will submit its recommendations to 
the organ(s) which have disciplinary powers over the official or staff concerned. Further, 
there should be strong internal systems for monitoring and evaluating the activities and 
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conduct of the PCCB and its staff. There should be vigorous checks and balances in order to 
control discretion and reduce chances for abuses of power. Ultimately, the fight against 
corruption needs to be institutionalised securely. 
4.5.3 Strengthening Law Enforcement 
The success of any anti-corruption regime depends upon the presence of robust law 
enforcement systems.155 Eventually, Tanzania must overcome its enforcement deficit for it 
to control corruption. To this end, the PCCB should be more pro-active in investigating 
corruption. This should begin with the installation of a solid complaints management system 
which encourages citizens to report corruption. All legal provisions that undermine 
whistleblowing should be removed from the statute book. Whistleblowers should be 
encouraged to report corruption with clear guarantees of anonymity and confidentiality. 
Also, the PCCB should be pro-active in gleaning corruption allegations from different fora, 
including the mass media and the social media, regardless of whether they are made 
formally or informally. 
Complaints received should be investigated thoroughly. In order to ensure that 
investigations are carried out professionally, the PCCB must be staffed with experts in 
various disciplines, including lawyers with expertise in anti-corruption law, forensic experts, 
intelligence experts, professional investigators, professional accountants and undercover 
experts. Further, there should be steady and efficient collaboration between the PCCB and 
other enforcement organs and oversight institutions, including the police force, the FIU and 
the CHRAGG, the CAG and the Ethics Secretariat. 
An investigation should be carried out against any person alleged to be involved in 
corruption, regardless of his social status or political affiliation. The big-and-small-fish 
syndrome should be eradicated. Likewise, there should not be discrimination between petty 
and grand corruption. As long as the complaint is alleging corruption, a proper investigation 
should be carried out. Reports of completed investigations should be publicised. This is 
important for restoring public confidence in the ACA. 
Completed investigations should be followed by effective prosecution. The DPP’s 
monopoly in the prosecution of corruption cases should be eliminated. The National 
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Prosecutions Act156 and the PCCA should be amended to allow the PCCB to prosecute all 
corruption crimes without needing to obtain the consent of the DPP. Additionally, after 
establishing the criminal liability of Presidents, the Constitution should empower the PCCB 
to investigate and prosecute them for corruption crimes. Moreover, sanctions for 
corruption crimes must be increased with a view to making corruption a high-risk crime. The 
PCCA should provide minimum sanctions for all corruption crimes in order to limit the 
discretion of courts when determining sentences. 
4.5.4 Establishing Anti-Corruption Units in Government Departments 
Anti-corruption units ought to be established in all government departments and 
institutions. The primary function of these units should be to analyse corruption risks in 
their situations. They should be responsible for the examination of the practices and 
procedures of those departments or institutions in order to determine corruption-prone 
areas and propose counter measures. Further, the units should provide anti-corruption 
education at their locations. They should be empowered to expose corrupt practices and to 
receive corruption complaints. Operationally, the units should be accountable to and work 
under the supervision of the PCCB. 
4.5.5 Soliciting Public Support 
The PCCB should revisit its techniques of enlisting public support, and it must strive to clean 
up its image before the public. At this point, publicity matters. The PCCB should adopt an 
open and transparent system of sharing information with the public. Reports covering the 
PCCB’s performance, including successful prosecutions, should be published in Kiswahili, 
which is the lingua franca, and should be accessible widely to the public. The Bureau should 
utilise all media fora, including newspapers, television, radio, websites and social media to 
educate the public about corruption and solicit their support in fighting it. 
4.5.6 Integrating Ethics and Anti-Corruption Studies in Curricula 
Tanzania needs to have good leaders in both political and management positions. However, 
good leaders are not born, they are made. Ethics and anti-corruption studies should be 
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introduced into the curricula of schools, colleges and universities. Courses on professional 
ethics should include topics on corruption and anti-corruption for the various professions. 
4.6 Limitations of the Proposed Reforms 
The implementation of the reforms proposed above is subject to a number of limitations 
which may hamper the process of creating a sustainable anti-corruption regime for 
Tanzania. These limitations include lack of political will and inadequate resources to fund 
anti-corruption activities. 
4.6.1 Lack of Political Will 
The most challenging aspect of anti-corruption work is the creation of the necessary political 
will. Deficient political will is the leading cause of corruption increasing in many countries. 
Simultaneously, strong political will is the nucleus of the anti-corruption process. Thus, the 
process of creating a sustainable anti-corruption regime in Tanzania requires potent political 
will to implement the proposed reforms. 
The proposed reforms entail major constitutional amendments. If implemented 
properly, the reforms may interfere with the interests of the ruling party, politicians and 
other prominent persons. Therefore, the constitutional amendments may not be welcomed 
by those in power. Tanzania completed its constitution review process in 2014 and there 
has been no progress regarding the referendum on the new Proposed Constitution. Indeed, 
on 4 November 2016, President Magufuli indicated that he was not interested in 
constitutional review currently.157 This does not bode well for the recommended anti-
corruption constitutional reforms. 
Changes to the institutional framework depend upon the political will of the 
government too. Without ample support from the government, the institutions charged 
with fighting corruption will continue as usual, making little progress in controlling 
corruption. 
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4.6.2 Inadequate Resources 
The effective implementation of the proposed reforms presupposes the availability of 
adequate human and financial resources. Although, the reforms are intended to be cost-
effective, a sustainable anti-corruption regime needs sufficient funds in order to attain the 
desired results. The political will of the government must be reinforced by financial 
commitment to the fight against corruption. 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
Fighting corruption is not an easy undertaking. It requires an uncompromising political will 
and government preparedness to track down the corrupt and protect the victims. It 
presumes strong public resistance to paying bribes and a public culture of exposing those 
who involve themselves in corrupt practices. It demands effective co-operation and co-
ordination amongst organs and institutions charged with the investigation, prosecution and 
adjudication of corruption. The experience of Hong Kong, Singapore and Botswana can 
serve well Tanzania’s efforts to reform its anti-corruption regime and adopt a more robust 
approach to combating corruption. 
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Chapter Five 
 
General Conclusion 
 
 
This study was conducted to explore avenues that may be adopted for creating a 
sustainable anti-corruption regime for Tanzania. Thus, it assessed the post-independence 
anti-corruption legislative enforcement trends in Tanzania with a view to determining the 
factors that favoured or impeded their success. It also analysed anti-corruption policies and 
programmes adopted by different post-independence governments in Tanzania, and 
examined the current legal and institutional anti-corruption regime in order to identify its 
deficiencies and to propose reforms. The study had recourse to the international anti-
corruption instruments to which Tanzania is a State Party, and gathered anti-corruption best 
practices from Hong Kong, Singapore and Botswana. 
Corruption had begun to mushroom in the Tanzanian public service a few years after 
independence. Since then, post-independence governments in Tanzania have attempted to 
fight corruption by adopting a range of legal and policy measures. Disappointingly, these 
measures have failed to reduce the levels of corruption in the country. 
The anti-corruption strategies deployed by the first, second, third and fourth post-
independence government regimes were constrained by a number of factors. For the first 
post-independence government regime, anti-corruption initiatives were hampered mainly 
by the bad economic situation that engulfed the country from the early 1970s to mid-1980s. 
President Nyerere was determined to fight corruption but the attempts by his government 
to implement laws and policies aimed at eliminating corrupt practices among public 
servants were thwarted by the economic environment. The bad economic situation also 
limited the government’s ability to fund anti-corruption activities. 
For the second post-independence government regime, anti-corruption work was 
fettered by the flaccidity of the government leaders. Apart from issuing the Presidential 
Circular on Guidelines for Deterrence of Corruption, transforming the Anti-Corruption Squad 
into the Prevention of Corruption Bureau, and enacting the Public Leadership Code of Ethics 
Act of 1995, no other significant initiatives were taken by this government regime. Hence, 
the spread of corruption in the late 1980s to the early 1990s is premised on the lack of 
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political will from the government’s top leaders. The same applies, more or less, to the third 
and fourth post-independence government regimes. During these regimes, laws were 
enacted and institutions were either established or overhauled with a view to fighting 
corruption more actively. However, these efforts were characterised by serious 
enforcement deficit which ultimately minimised their impact on corruption. 
The fifth post-independence government regime has been in power for one-and-a-
half years and has demonstrated a commitment to fighting corruption, with President 
Magufuli identifying himself as a leader with a zero tolerance policy to corruption. However, 
Magufuli’s anti-corruption approach, too, is unsustainable. His approach does not seek to 
empower institutions to fight corruption persistently, but concentrates on ambushing it 
episodically. Also, Magufuli is focusing on building his image as a strong leader and not on 
building strong institutions which can fight corruption even in his absence. 
The current Tanzanian anti-corruption regime has many deficiencies that encumber 
its sustainability. Firstly, fighting corruption is dependent upon the personal will of the 
President. The law does not obligate Tanzanian Presidents to fight corruption. Conversely, it 
immunises them from criminal prosecutions for crimes they commit while in office, 
including corruption. Also, institutions charged with fighting corruption are subject to the 
will of the President. Hence, when the President is weak on corruption, the entire anti-
corruption regime virtually is paralysed.  
Secondly, Parliament has not been pro-active enough in holding the government 
accountable with regard to fighting corruption. Even where some of its members have been 
implicated in corruption scandals, Parliament has failed to demand investigations against 
them. Thirdly, organs charged with fighting corruption and promoting good governance are 
not fully independent. Lack of independence affects the impartiality of these institutions 
and diminishes public confidence in their operations. Fourthly, anti-corruption efforts are 
curtailed by the poor law enforcement that surrounds the investigation, prosecution and 
adjudication system. Finally, public support for anti-corruption is almost absent. There are 
no workable strategies for enlisting the public support, and whistleblower laws do not 
encourage corruption reporting. 
The Tanzanian anti-corruption regime is in need of reform to make it more cost 
effective and more practicable. Thus, the study recommends the introduction of a 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
  
 
 
 
86 
constitutional anchor for the fight against corruption, including the removal of the immunity 
from criminal prosecution for Presidents. It also recommends re-structuring of the PCCB in 
order to give it a constitutional endorsement in fighting corruption. This involves 
empowering the PCCB to investigate and prosecute corruption allegations against anyone in 
Tanzania, including the President. 
Further, the law enforcement system needs to be strengthened by such measures as 
the establishment of friendly whistleblower procedures and the provision of adequate 
resources for the PCCB. Anti-corruption units ought to be established in government 
institutions and departments with a view to decentralising anti-corruption work. Anti-
corruption and ethics studies ought to be introduced at all levels of education, from primary 
schools to universities, in order to breed a generation of good leaders and anti-corruption 
topics ought to be integrated into all courses on professional ethics. 
Generally, Tanzania can control corruption if it adopts a more robust and sustainable 
approach to the problem. Already the country has a broad legal and institutional framework 
for fighting corruption in place. What is missing is the will to empower and capacitate the 
elements of this framework in order to attain the desired results. The proposed reforms 
seek to eliminate this deficit of political will in fighting corruption and facilitate sustainable 
anti-corruption work in Tanzania. 
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